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INTRODUCTION

Religious freedom is a core component of our nation and one of the
most widely known and accepted constitutional guarantees provided by the
First Amendment. No prior civilization had adopted a national policy that
tolerated various religious beliefs while simultaneously refusing to endorse
or promote a national religion. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion of
United States v. Ballard, summarized that the founders were well aware of
the potential for religious divisiveness when “[t]hey fashioned a charter of
government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting
[religious] views. Man’s relation to his God was made no concern of the
state.”1 Considering the fundamental backdrop of religious tolerance, it
might seem unimaginable that a skilled medical technician could be fired
from her job, an alleged victim of sexual abuse could have her credibility
undermined in a court of law, or a mother could lose custody of her child,
under the color of legality, because of their religious beliefs. Yet, the startling reality is that many courts have allowed for the disparate and discriminatory treatment of earth-based religious beliefs broadly labeled as NeoPaganism.2
Courts have vastly inconsistent views in their recognition and treatment of emergent earth-based religions.3 While many courts fully and accurately recognize the religious rights and freedoms of proclaimed NeoPagans, others explicitly or implicitly utilize mechanisms of law to engender hostility and perpetuate centuries-old stereotypes against such practitioners.4 The focus of this Comment is to identify the ways that some courts
effectuate the disparate treatment of Wiccans, Witches, and similar faiths
under the Neo-Pagan umbrella, so that Neo-Paganism can receive the same
constitutional protections it is entitled to, along with all other valid religions.
1.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
2.
See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D.
Iowa 2006); State v. Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890 (Kan. 2001); Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244
(Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
3.
Compare Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982)
(holding by a slight majority that Wicca was a recognized religion according to Supreme
Court criterion), with Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 913-14 (allowing impeachment of a victimwitness’s credibility due to her Wiccan beliefs).
4.
See Gelford v. Franks, No. 07-C-258-5, 2007 WL 5582586, at *2 (W.D. Wis.
Sept. 29, 2007) (noting that Wisconsin law “allow[s] Wicca[n] inmates to possess one emblem . . . for religious purposes”). But see Raper v. Adams, No. 5:06-CT-41-D, 2007 WL
3532344, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2007) (concluding that a prison must be allowed great
deference in forbidding a Wiccan from using tarot cards with other inmates, because tarot
readings pose a security risk).
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The basic tenets of the Neo-Pagan belief system are first summarized
to show how its beliefs are congruent with many aspects of “orthodox
faiths.”5 Some distinctions are also discussed, but perhaps most importantly, common misconceptions that have inaccurately portrayed Wicca and
Neo-Paganism as malevolent and/or anti-establishment belief systems are
addressed.
Next, the history and definition of American religious rights are summarized to show how Neo-Paganism comports with the Supreme Court’s
definition of a valid religion protected by the United States Constitution.6
Such recognition demonstrates that judicial and legislative discrimination
against Neo-Pagans at any level is impermissible and in violation of the
Constitution.7
Applying this legal conclusion, multiple courts have violated constitutional protections by continuing to discriminate against Neo-Pagans.8 Specific cases involving parental rights,9 employment discrimination law under
Title VII’s religious entity exemption,10 and rules of evidence11 are analyzed to demonstrate how courts are enabled to unconstitutionally admit
and/or use prejudicial religious information against Neo-Pagan practitioners.
While treatment of Neo-Pagans in the context of parental rights, evidentiary impeachment of character, and employment discrimination (specific to Title VII’s religious entity exemption) are the detailed areas explored in this article, there are almost as many potential areas of law impacted by discrimination against Neo-Paganism as there are legal causes of
action.12 The reason such an expansive range of cases exists is that any
5.
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 (“[Freedom of religious belief] embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers
of the orthodox faiths.”) (emphasis added). The use of the word “orthodox” will be used to
describe the five largest world religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and
Judaism; the word “unorthodox” will be used to describe all other religious beliefs. These
words are admittedly imperfect, because unorthodox has a negative connotation. However,
the Supreme Court has relied on these words in this general context. See, e.g., United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
6.
See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86.
7.
E.g., Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
8.
See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D.
Iowa 2006); In re Hilton, Nos. 06CA106, 06CA107, 2007 WL 2298129 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
7, 2007); Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
9.
E.g., Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057; Hicks, 288 S.W.3d 244.
10.
E.g., Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021; Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. S880353, 1989 WL 53857 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 9, 1989).
11.
E.g., State v. Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890, 913-14 (Kan. 2001); In re Hilton, 2007 WL
2298129.
12.
E.g., Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 631 F. Supp. 2d 823 (E.D. La. 2009)
(reviewing conduct of school board in the context of a potential Establishment Clause viola-
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criminal or civil case that improperly considers a party or witness’s NeoPagan faith may compromise the court’s decision by an irrelevant prejudice. The pocket areas selected will serve as a microcosm of the ways in
which unconstitutional discrimination continues to occur against NeoPagans. Whether the discrimination is a product of ignorance, complacency,
or complicity, the hope is that heightened legal awareness will eradicate
what has become a recurring, if not systemic, atrocity in our judicial system.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND ON NEO-PAGANISM

WICCA AND NEO-PAGANISM: WHAT IS IT AND WHICH IS WITCH?

The term Neo-Paganism is used here as the broadest term to encompass a seemingly wide array of spiritual practices that include various forms
of Wicca,13 Witchcraft,14 Druidism and Indo-European Shamanism,15 and
Asatru and pantheistic deity worship.16 While most of these subdivisions
contain practices distinct from the other labeled groups,17 they all fall under
the penumbra of Neo-Paganism, so “[a]ll Wiccans are pagans, but not all
pagans are Wiccans.”18 While practitioners of the various forms of NeoPaganism may be very particular about how they define themselves, such as
Wiccan or Witch or Pagan, Neo-Paganism will be used as the most expedient word to convey all branches of Pagan religion.19
tion against non-Christian beliefs); McCollum v. California, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (regarding rights of prison inmates to practice Wicca); Fender v. Kansas Soc. &
Rehab. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Kan. 2001) (concerning a Wiccan employee’s Title
VII religious discrimination claim alleging a hostile work environment).
13.
Generally, Wicca emphasizes magic and divination through use of candles,
knots, herbs, and harnessing energy through lunar and other natural cycles. Wiccans also
commonly observe and invoke earth spirits or fairies. See generally ANN MOURA, GREEN
WITCHCRAFT (2002).
14.
The terms Witch and Witchcraft are largely synonymous with Wiccan and
Wicca, although practitioners may attribute specific meaning to the terms. Id. at 13.
15.
Generally, Druidism and Shamanism emphasize transformative spiritual journeys through meditative and ecstatic practices. See generally ROSALYN GREENE, THE MAGIC
OF SHAPESHIFTING (2000).
16.
Some Neo-Pagans invoke the energy of polytheistic deities, commonly including deities from ancient Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, and Sumerian pantheons. Asatru is the
specific observance of European-based deities most commonly associated with the Norse
pantheon. See generally IVO DOMINGUEZ, JR., OF SPIRITS: THE BOOK OF ROWAN (2001).
17.
See generally MOURA, GREEN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 13; GREENE, supra note
15; DOMINGUEZ, supra note 16.
18.
IRIS FIREMOON, FIREFLY: WICCAN ADVANCEMENT 13 (2008).
19.
Native American religion is highly similar and interchangeable with the abovementioned forms of Neo-Paganism. However, the American legal treatment of Native
American religions has a storied history stemming from the colonial era. It would be disin-
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The core of Neo-Paganism is the central belief that humans are connected to and should strive to live in harmony with the Earth, elements of
nature, and the universe by extension.20 While the Neo-Pagan belief system
embraces a multitude of ways to invoke the divine, most Neo-Pagans observe a complex central deity, typically referred to as the Goddess, Mother
Earth, or Gaia.21 The names of this fundamental deity reflect the Neo-Pagan
belief that humans are part of the Earth and part of the Goddess, although
Neo-Pagans extend this central belief to the entire cosmos.22
The Goddess, while usually personified as feminine, is dualistically
“female and male, transcendent yet the center of all,” revealing that She is
both the progenitor of all creation and simultaneously part of all creation.23
While the Neo-Pagan movement is commonly considered to have cognizably emerged in the late twentieth century,24 Neo-Pagans consider observance of the Mother Goddess to reflect the purest and most ancient form of
spirituality.25 The Goddess is commonly revered as a tripartite deity of the
feminine: Mother, Maiden, and Crone26 with a dualistic tripartite deity27 of
genuous to group the unique treatment of indigenous religions with the treatment of the
modern Neo-Pagan movement. See CAROL BARNER-BARRY, CONTEMPORARY PAGANISM:
MINORITY RELIGIONS IN A MAJORITARIAN AMERICA 13-19 (2005) (recounting the history of
Native American religious rights, notably the Rule of Discovery that Chief Justice John
Marshall used to undermine the Native American’s claim to land rights due to their nonChristian beliefs and being “fierce savages.” Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590-91
(1823)).
20.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 13 (“The earth. She vibrates as the universe
dances in spirals within itself. . . . There is a single driving force behind these things, just as
we somehow feel inherently connected with them.”).
21.
Id. at 15.
22.
Id. at 15-16 (stating that a Wiccan strives “to become more aware of the earth,
the universe, and the self”).
23.
JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE 157 (1974).
24.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 157-58 (recalling Gerald Gardner’s seminal
work establishing the “Gardnerian Wicca” tradition in the 1950s in England, and Raymond
Buckland’s effort that brought his “Seax Wiccan” tradition from England to the United
States). But see MOURA, GREEN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 13 at 13 (critiquing the overemphasis on late twentieth century initiatory traditions of Gardner and others. Moura contends
the modern initiatory traditions are just one aspect of a much richer and older tradition); see
also BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 33 (affirming that there is a group of practitioners,
hereditary witches, who trace their religious lineage back generations, even centuries).
25.
See PHYLLIS CUROTT, BOOK OF SHADOWS 57 (1998) (stating the origin of “Goddess worship dates back to the Upper Paleolithic Age, about 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.E.”). See
also Ambreen Ali, Statue of Busty Woman May Be World’s Oldest, NEWSER, (May 13,
2009),
http://www.newser.com/story/58907/statue-of-busty-woman-may-be-worldsoldest.html (recounting the discovery of a 35,000 year old ivory statue depicting a fullfigured female); MOURA, GREEN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 13, at 26 (stating a large body and
exaggerated sexual features are “the earliest images of the Divine as female”).
26.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 15 (explaining the three forms of the Triple
Goddess are “the Maiden, the Mother, and the Crone”).
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the masculine: Father/Creator, Son/Preserver, and a third sage-like and/or
warlike male deity.28 The triple aspects of a dualistic deity are representative of the cycle of life, death, and rebirth, the changing seasons, and the
dynamic universe.29 Similar triple aspects of a central deity are found in
Eastern and Western orthodox religions.30
Neo-Paganism’s central tenet of harmony with nature inherently promotes peaceful behavior and benevolent use of powers derived from the
faith.31 A basic observance in Neo-Paganism is The Law of Return or The
Threefold Rule: “[W]hatever magical power is sent out returns threefold . . .
. You do not want to harm others because what is sent comes back,” and the
Witches’ Rede: “If it harms none, do what you will . . . .”32 The underlying
principle is that each person is connected to and able to access the energy of
the entire universe.33 Magic is how a Neo-Pagan practitioner acts as a conduit of this energy to manifest his or her intent to a specific focal point, a
27.
ANN MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT 41 (2002) (“The idea of Deity
as dualistic had entered into human consciousness by at least 28,000 B.C.E. . . . . People
honored a ‘Great He/She’ deity . . . .”).
28.
See MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 47-48 (explaining that Shiva “as the Holy Spirit” in the current Hindu Trinity “with God the Father as
Brahma, Vishnu as God the Son (that aspect of Deity which becomes incarnate from time to
time),” supplanted “Indra, the Great Warrior” as the third Deity. Similarly, the Norse Male
Trinity includes “Odin, King of the Gods; Tyr, the Lawgiver; and Thor, the Great Warrior”).
29.
Neo-Pagans view divinity alternately as one, two, three, or more interconnected
and balanced aspects:
The more we “cut apart” the divine, the more we understand it, although
the further we may be from the whole picture. If we cut the deity into
two parts, we visualize the God and the Goddess. This duality is seen in
many forms: light/dark powers . . . [and] yin/yang . . . . When the deity is
cut into three parts, we expose the secrets of . . . (The Triple Goddess),
which represents the phases of the moon, and rites of passage. If the deity is cut into four parts, we see the four elements (earth, air, fire, and
water), with spirit being the glue that connects them.
FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 15.
30.
See, e.g., MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 119
(explaining that in Hinduism, “[t]he Triple Goddes is still Shakti, and the Horned God is still
Shiva, who is specifically named in India as Shiva Tryambaka—wed to the Triple Goddess”)
(emphasis in original); Lewis Loflin, Overview of Gnosticism, http://www.sullivancounty.com/id2/gnosticism.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (stating that Christianity observes the Holy Trinity: father, son, and holy spirit and “in Gnosticism the Holy Spirit was
the ‘feminine’ or female aspect of God. Thus the Holy Spirit was the true ‘mother’ of Jesus”).
31.
Most books containing applicable practices of Neo-Paganism include an admonishment to use the powers of the faith for beneficial purposes only, such as: “magick should
not intentionally be used to harm others. Spells which interfere with a person’s choice and
free will, are considered . . . out of bounds . . . . What a person does to others . . . that person
does to himself or herself as well.” FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 19 (emphasis in original).
32.
See MOURA, GREEN WITCRAFT, supra note 13, at 11.
33.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 18, 22.
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process by which he becomes more intensely subject to the energy than the
recipient of the magic.34
To illustrate this process with a basic metaphor, imagine the process of
jumping a car battery. There are three things needed: a power source—
either a generator or another car’s battery, a jumper cable, and the dead
battery. While the purpose of jumping the car is to transfer energy into the
dead battery, the jumper cable is exposed to more of the energy from the
power source than the actual dead battery, because the cables must be connected to the power source before and after the energy is transferred. Metaphorically, the practitioner of Neo-Paganism is the jumper cable who ritualistically connects and disconnects from the power source in order to imbue
an entity with power.35 It would be counterintuitive and self-destructive for
a Neo-Pagan to expose himself to anything but positive energy.36 Positive
energy not only means benevolent, but it also means that the target must be
receptive to the magic, because it would be impermissible to manipulate
another person with magic against their will even if it was for a seemingly
good cause.37
The core principles of Neo-Paganism reveal that the religion is fundamentally gentle and emphasizes harmony with all external forces, whether
they are natural, human, or spiritual. A closer examination reveals that NeoPaganism is more similar than dissimilar to many aspects of orthodox religions.
B.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NEO-PAGANISM AND
ORTHODOX RELIGIONS

The similarities between Neo-Paganism and orthodox religions are
more striking than the differences. A few areas of significant overlap are
how and when the holy days are observed, and fundamental beliefs about
the practitioner’s place in the universe.
Neo-Pagans celebrate the lunar cycles, typically on Esbats when the
moon is full,38 as well as eight major annual holidays, called Sabbats.39
Each phase of the lunar cycle and the Sabbats correspond to a cycle or

34.
See id. at 19, 22.
35.
See id. at 22.
36.
See id. at 19-23.
37.
See id.
38.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 45.
39.
See id. at 43-44. “The word ‘Sabbat’ comes from the old Greek word ‘sabatu,’
meaning ‘to rest’” and shares the same derivative history as the similar word used by orthodox religions, “Sabbath.” EDAIN MCCOY, SABBATS, A WITCH’S APPROACH TO LIVING THE
OLD WAYS 4 (2002).
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phase of life.40 The Sabbats each last approximately six-and-a-half-weeks,
beginning with Yule on the winter solstice on December 21 or 22 (birth),
which also marks the ending point of the Samhain period (death).41
Each Sabbat represents a stage of life, so Yule symbolizes the sun returning “after the darkest night of the year to again bring warmth and fertility,”42 and its diametric opposite, Sabbat of Midsummer on June 22 marking “the height of the sun’s power” before declining for the next six
months.43 The observance of major Neo-Pagan Sabbats is intriguingly similar, in timing and substance, to the major holy days of orthodox religions,
particularly Roman Catholicism.44 Consider the following chart:45

40.
See CUROTT, supra note 25, at 184 (describing the significance of magic connected to each lunar phase); MCCOY, supra note 39, at 4 (stating “[t]he eight solar Sabbats . .
. each honor[ ] a stage in the eternal life cycle of the Goddess and the God. Many pagans see
time as one eternal whole which is forever turning . . . .”).
41.
MOURA, GREEN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 13, at 183 (marking “the departure of
the Holly King (known today as the Dark Lord, old Saint Nick, and Father Time) and arrival
of the Oak King (known today as the Sun King, Jesus, and the New Year’s Baby) . . . .”).
42.
See MCCOY, supra note 39, at 53.
43.
Id. at 149.
44.
See CUROTT, supra note 25, at 293-94.
45.
See MCCOY, supra note 39, at 23-189; CUROTT, supra note 25, at 293-94;
INTERFAITH CALENDAR, http://interfaithcalendar.org/index.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2010);
Hanukkah, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/hanukkah (last visited Oct. 5,
2010); Hinduism, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/hinduism (last visited Oct.
5, 2010); Ajaan Lee Dhammadharo, Visakha Puja, METTA FOREST MONASTERY (last visited
Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/thai/lee/visakha.html; THE UPPER ROOM,
http://www.upperroom.org/askjulian/default.asp?act=answer&itemid=39734 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2010); Pentecost, NEW ADVENT, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15614b.htm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010); What is Isra and Lailat al Miraj?, IMUSLIMZ NETWORK,
http://www.imuslimz.com/what-is-isra-and-lailat-al-miraj (last visited Oct. 5, 2010);
SOJOURNEY, http://www.sojourney.co.za (last visited Oct. 5, 2010); Ariela Pelaia, Judiasim,
ABOUT.COM, http://judaism.about.com/od/holidays/a/roshhashanah.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2010).
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Without detailing the nuanced similarities between certain Neo-Pagan
and orthodox holidays, a cursory review indicates that the general timing
and significance of many orthodox religious observances are intriguingly
similar to Neo-Paganism. Even the Neo-Pagan observance of lunar holy
days is a concept similarly engrained in orthodox religions, as most belief
systems have cosmologically reconciled the cyclical differences between
the sun and the moon.46
Also similar, the aforementioned Neo-Pagan Law of Return and the
Witches’ Rede47 that emphasize benevolent behavior and a karmic sensibility are reminiscent of the Golden Rule of Confucianism48 and the teachings
of Jesus Christ.49 The Neo-Pagan belief in the impermanence of life and the
interconnectivity of the universe strikes a transcendental chord very akin to
Zen Buddhism: “[I]mpermanence itself is preaching impermanence . . . and
this, as it is, is preaching, practising, and realizing the Buddha-nature.”50
It is significant that many Neo-Pagan practitioners observe beliefs
from multiple subdivisions therein, so Neo-Pagans may practice Wiccan
candle magic, Druidic shamanism, and meditate through ecstatic magic and
refer to their beliefs by one or more of these labels.51 Interestingly, it is not
uncommon for Neo-Pagans to incorporate aspects of orthodox religion into
their beliefs, such as Judaism or Hinduism.52
At first blush this seeming hodgepodge of beliefs gives rise to some
critics’ assertion that Neo-Paganism is too unstructured to be classified as a
religion.53 This argument is negated by two major arguments. First, NeoPaganism is a dynamic belief system that anticipates adaptations and em46.
See CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE, supra note 23, at 141-62 (stating that numerous belief systems have a duodecimal (based on the number twelve) or sexagesimal
(based on the number sixty) calendar at odds with the number thirteen that must compensate
for the variance between the imperfect number of lunar cycles in the approximately 365.25
day solar year. Many systems measure longer periods or ages of time in accordance with a
complete cycle in which the disparity resets itself).
47.
See supra Part II.A.
48.
World Scripture, UNIFICATION, http://www.unification.net/ws/theme015.htm
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (“Tsekung asked, ‘Is there one word that can serve as a principle
of conduct for life?’ Confucius replied, ‘It is the word shu--reciprocity: Do not do to others
what you do not want them to do to you.’”).
49.
Mark 12:31(New Oxford) (“You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”).
50.
MASAO ABE, ZEN AND WESTERN THOUGHT 52 (1985).
51.
See MCCOY, supra note 39, at 3 (“Modern paganism is a rich tapestry of interwoven traditions, ideas, and orientation.”).
52.
E.g., MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 174 (explaining that many Neo-Pagans observe Kabballah which “despite allegations of [its] ancient
origins . . . the historic [origin] is in the Jewish community of medieval Europe”);
FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 45 (noting that deities associated with the New Moon in NeoPaganism include two Hindu gods, Kali and Shiva).
53.
See Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Ga.
1982) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
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braces any knowledge—scientific54 or religious—that heightens awareness
of the workings and interconnections of the universe.55 Therefore, it is natural for Neo-Pagans to incorporate any pertinent observance or practice that
better enables them to connect to the divine without necessarily subscribing
to all surrounding dogma.56
A related belief in Neo-Paganism is that many modern orthodox beliefs are static adoptions of more ancient and universal Neo-Pagan beliefs;57
so orthodox versions of creation,58 a great deluge,59 and the virgin birth of
the solar or redemptive god,60 for example, are implicitly Neo-Pagan and
therefore welcome variations of the same principal symbolism.61
Second, every major orthodox religion has notable diversity in the
specific beliefs of the various subsets of the larger religion, so differences
between Neo-Pagan practitioners are not aberrant from differences within
other accepted belief systems. For example, the Sunni and Shiite branches
of Islamic faith are divided as to whether Allah is corporeal, and the Sunnis
deviate from the Shiites belief in the “House of Ali who is believed to have
54.
See MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 1 (“Awareness of universal bodies . . . and the possibility of life on other planets . . . force[s] us to
realize that we can no longer consider ourselves isolated from the rest of the universe.”).
55.
See id. (elaborating that “[o]ver time, [Neo-Paganism] evolved to reflect, and
deflect, changes in society, economy, politics, and the new religions that supported these
innovations . . . . [T]he Old Religion never lost its deeper awareness of the interrelationship
of all life on Earth and our place among the stars”); KEN WILBER, QUANTUM QUESTIONS 113
(2000) (“[T]hose individuals to whom we owe the great creative achievements of science
were all of them imbued with the truly religious conviction that this universe of ours is
something perfect and susceptible to the rational striving of knowledge.”).
56.
See MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 1-3.
57.
See id.
58.
Compare id. at 29 (explaining the 7000 year old Dravidian mythology “that
addressed the creation of the world in seven days . . . the Tree of Life . . . and the snake . . .
.”), with Genesis 1:1-3:13 (New Oxford) (recounting a Western Orthodox Creation belief
that “on the seventh day God finished the work” of creating the universe before “the serpent” compelled the first humans to consume from “the tree of knowledge”).
59.
Stories of a great flood exist in the indigenous mythologies of several continents, as well as some island nations. See JOSEPH CAMPBELL, MYTHS TO LIVE BY 74-76
(1972).
60.
See MOURA, ORIGINS OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 99-105;
CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE, supra note 23, at 32-66 (showing similarities in Christian,
Egyptian, Greek, Hindu, Persian, Phrygian, and Roman deities).
The recurrence of many of the best-loved themes of the older, pagan mythologies in legends of the Christian Savior was a recognized feature intentionally stressed in the earliest Christian centuries. . . . [T]he birth,
death, and resurrection of the new [Christian] savior . . . prefigured in
the mere myths of the pagan gods . . . .
CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE, supra note 23, at 32-33 (emphasis added).
61.
See CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC IMAGE, supra note 23, at 32-33; MOURA, ORIGINS
OF MODERN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 27, at 1.
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been [Allah]’s designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in
that line.”62 Sunnis do not recognize Ali and his descendants to have been
the only chosen leadership of Allah, which was the cause of the initial split
in the groups, stemming to around 680 CE.63
Similarly, subsets of Christianity differ vastly about many beliefs, including: the existence of Purgatory; whether the Apocrypha is a sacred text;
the status of Mary, mother of Jesus; and whether the actual flesh and blood
of Jesus Christ is transmogrified through the communion ritual.64 The fact
that Neo-Pagans may connect to the divine by meditating for guidance,
tying knots to manifest intention, conduct rituals to summon natural elements, and/or invoke an anthropomorphic deity(ies) and possibly earth spirits is not dissimilar to Christians who may pray for guidance, use a cross or
rosary beads, partake in communion to symbolically or actually consume
their deity, and/or invoke a tripartite deity and a vast array of saints.65
A true distinction of Neo-Paganism from Western orthodox religions
does exist, however. Neo-Pagans practice magic, which is manipulating
aspects of reality by manifesting personal intent through various magical
media.66 Unlike Western orthodox religions that seek results from appealing
to the external power of a supreme being, many Neo-Pagans believe the
power to attain results is internal and the use of outside media enables them
to hone and intensify their innate power:67
Magic[ ] has been compared to the concept of praying, but
this is a false statement. Praying is passive, in which practitioners ask an outside consciousness to make changes for
them. Utilizing magic[ ] is an active task, requiring practi-

62.
Bethany Mason, Following the Prophet: A Comparison of Sunni and Shiite
Muslims, EAST TENN. STATE UNIV. (Apr. 2006), http://www.etsu.edu/writing/teaching
&theory_s06/sunnis.htm.
63.
Id.
64.
See Comparison of Christian Denominations’ Beliefs, RELIGION FACTS, (March
5, 2005), http://www.religionfacts.com/christianity/charts/denominations_beliefs.htm (explaining that Catholics alone believe in Purgatory, only Catholics and Greek Orthodox believe the Apocrypha to be sacred text, and Greek Orthodox do not believe in the immaculate
conception of Jesus, while Catholics believe Mary was sinless and was assumed into heaven
instead of dying); see also PRUDENCE JONES & NIGEL PENNICK, A HISTORY OF PAGAN
EUROPE 75 (1995).
65.
See JONES & PENNICK supra note 64, at 103-05, 160-62 (noting that many Christian saints are synonymous with traditional pagan deities and earth-spirits).
66.
“Magick runs through all of us. It is the cosmic energy that is within everything.” FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 18 (explaining further that Neo-Pagans use magic to
“‘stir up the energy a little bit’ for a specific purpose”).
67.
Id.
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tioners to use their connection to the universe to make
changes for themselves.68
So where a Jew might pray to God for a sick person to convalesce, a
Neo-Pagan might conduct a healing ritual with candles and invoke elements
of nature to raise and channel healing energy to the ill person.69
Courts occasionally use this self-powered and seemingly non-deistic
belief in magic to discredit Neo-Paganism as a religion: “‘The essence of
religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.’ In my opinion the Wiccan faith does not
meet this test.”70 This statement of Georgia’s Chief Justice Jordan suggests
that only a belief system revolving around an omnipotent, monotheistic
deity can be considered a religion.71 However, the self-powered aspect of
Neo-Pagan practice does not justify its removal from the penumbra of recognized religion. Even Neo-Pagan practitioners that do not invoke an actual
deity in their magic still consider themselves part of the Goddess, thus, the
Goddess is implicit in any magical act a Neo-Pagan performs.72 Thus, there
is a belief in a relation to a superior, albeit androgynous, deity, which may
suffice to meet the Chief Justice’s interpretation.73
Furthermore, even if Chief Justice Jordan’s interpretation of religion is
most narrowly construed and would be considered valid, arguendo, the
literal application of his standard could discount most forms of orthodox
religion: Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism. The latter two religions
could be viewed as similarly polytheistic because they centrally believe in a
three-part deity; therefore they do not adhere to a “relation to God” in the
singular.74 Buddhism espouses the quest to achieve Nirvana, which means
that the practitioner in herself possesses the self-powered ability to be one
and co-equal with the highest level of divinity, thereby failing to meet Jordan’s requirement that deity be superior to humans.75 Therefore, similar
arguments could be made to discredit the recognition of orthodox religions
by the same standards the Chief Justice leverages to discredit NeoPaganism.76

68.
Id. at 18-19.
69.
Id.
70.
E.g., Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 661 (Ga. 1982)
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931)
(Hughes, J., dissenting)).
71.
Id.
72.
See supra Part II.A.
73.
Roberts, 292 S.E.2d at 661 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
74.
See supra Part II.A.
75.
See supra Part II.A.
76.
Roberts, 292 S.E.2d at 661 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
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As is evidenced by Chief Justice Jordan’s short-sighted dissent, any attempt to differentiate characteristics of Neo-Paganism from orthodox religions is difficult, because the common threads between orthodox religions
and Neo-Paganism weave an intricate web that cannot be pulled apart by a
clear-cut definition of what constitutes a religion.77 Inspired by similar difficulties, the United States Supreme Court has rejected narrow interpretations of religion and moved away from court-defined qualities of theism
and focused on the individual’s belief, as will be discussed in finer detail in
Part II.D.78
C.

THE NEO-PAGAN STRUGGLE TO OVERCOME MILLENIA OF ERRONEOUS
AND DEMEANING STEREOTYPES

Neo-Pagans do not observe or even recognize Satan,79 because Satan
is a figure originating from the Jewish-Christian-Islamic belief system.80
Western orthodox religions emphasize a strict dichotomy of good and evil,
therefore, the existence of the supremely good God requires a vying inappositely evil being like Satan.81 Neo-Paganism is about harmony and balance, so while the Goddess has a creative and a destructive aspect, destruction is viewed as a necessary phase of existence and is not viewed as malevolent.82 For example, crops must be harvested, which is a destructive act
even though the food is then used to sustain life.83 Furthermore, it would be
counter-intuitive to suggest that practitioners of a faith that believes in The
Threefold Rule would intentionally bring harm to others, because they
would cause greater harm to themselves.84

77.
Id.; see also supra Part II.A.
78.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (overturning traditional attempts
by the Court to define religion in terms of belief in a monotheistic deity, as had been done in
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)).
79.
See MOURA, GREEN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 13, at 27 (“The Christian deity of
evil is not part of the Witch’s pantheon. Instead, the dark and the light are seen as a balance
of positive and negative energies—every yin has its yang.”).
80.
See Genesis 3:1-22 (describing Satan as the serpent in the Garden of Eden); Job
1:6-12 (attributing divine capabilities to Satan); Isaiah 14:12-14 (describing Satan’s hubris
and fall from grace, antithetical to the followers of God).
81.
Isaiah 14:12-14.
82.
See MOURA, GREEN WITCHCRAFT, supra note 13, at 242 (reciting part of the
Mabon (second harvest) ritual: “The wheel of the year is ever turning, through sun tides and
mood tides, through seasons and harvests, for plants and for people; for all life moves within
the wheel of the year from life to death to life again”).
83.
See generally MCCOY, supra note 39, at 173-77 (recounting the symbolism of
the first harvest Sabbat, Lughnasadh).
84.
See supra Part II.A.
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Despite the gentle and non-dichotomous nature of Neo-Pagan beliefs,
the Western orthodoxy’s sense of conflicting forces is often projected onto
Neo-Paganism in popular media, creating and perpetuating misconceptions
about Neo-Pagan practices.85 The concept of white magic versus black
magic is not grounded in Neo-Paganism but in the entertainment world:
With fairytales of bad witches, spiders, and hexes, it is easy
to come to the conclusion that dark forces are evil. Although disappointing to the average Hollywood director,
dark magick does not refer to black magick. While dark
magick refers to the balance of natural cycles of life, black
magick is done at the cost of life and liberty. Black magick
is any magickal working that has the intent to harm, manipulate, or force others against their will. Black magick
has no place in Wicca and those who claim otherwise are
imposters.86
The movie The Wizard of Oz87 seminally featured a good witch and a
bad witch. More recently, the Harry Potter books88 and movie franchise89
and popular television series, such as Charmed90 and Supernatural,91 depict
benevolent magic, but also depict co-equal malevolent magic. Worse still

85.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 117.
86.
Id.
87.
THE WIZARD OF OZ (Twentieth Century Fox 1939).
88.
J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (Arthur A. Levine
Books 1998); J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS (Arthur A.
Levine Books 1999); J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (Arthur A. Levine Books 1999); J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (Arthur A. Levine Books 2000); J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE
PHOENIX (Arthur A. Levine Books 2003); J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF
BLOOD PRINCE (Arthur A. Levine Books 2005); J. K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE
DEATHLY HALLOWS (Arthur A. Levine Books 2007).
89.
HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (Warner Brothers Pictures 2001);
HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS (Warner Brothers Pictures 2002); HARRY
POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (Warner Brothers Pictures 2004); HARRY POTTER
AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (Warner Brothers Pictures 2005); HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER
OF THE PHOENIX (Warner Brothers Pictures 2007); HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF BLOOD
PRINCE (Warner Brothers Pictures 2009); HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS, PART
1 (Warner Brothers Pictures 2010); HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS, PART 2
(Warner Brothers Pictures 2011).
90.
Charmed (WB Television Network television series broadcast 1998-2006).
91.
Supernatural (WB Network television series broadcast 2005-06; CW Network
television series broadcast 2006-present).
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are depictions of Neo-Pagans as purely barbaric or evil, such as the cult
classics, The Wicker Man92 and The Blair Witch Project.93
A rough analogy to demonstrate the nonsensicality of these popular
images would be if every media depiction of a devout Christian included a
struggle against a co-equal satanic force. Imagine The Flying Nun94 pitted
in an epic battle against an aeronautical worshipper of Satan. Imagine the
family from 7th Heaven95 using the power of Jesus Christ in every episode
to engage in mortal combat with the forces of evil that are equally represented and powerful amongst the population. The degree of ridiculousness
that a Christian would perceive from such ubiquitously extreme and inaccurate depictions of Christianity is equivalent to what Wiccans perceive from
popular media depictions of their faith. Yet the entertainment world has
little use for depicting a Neo-Pagan living an ordinary existence, dealing
with realistic ordeals.96
Vampirism, the practice of drinking human blood, is also a distorted
byproduct of Western orthodox religion with no basis in Neo-Paganism.97
The folklore surrounding vampires makes them a bizarre version of the
Antichrist:98 shunning the Christian cross, rising corporeally from the dead,
and ritualistically drinking the blood of others. 99 A vampire’s sanguineous
partaking in which it damns the soul of the human victim100 is conspicuously converse to Jesus Christ who offered his blood to redeem the souls of
humans.101 The concept of a corpse returning to life is anathema to Neo92.
THE WICKER MAN (British Lion Films 1973) (remade by Warner Brothers Pictures 2006).
93.
THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT (Haxan Films 1999).
94.
The Flying Nun (ABC television series broadcast 1967-1970).
95.
7th Heaven (WB Network television series broadcast 1996-2006, CW Network
television series broadcast 2006-2007).
96.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 117.
97.
The basis for the modern vampire image derives from southeastern Europe in
the eighteenth century. The quintessential vampire, Dracula, is based on the fifteenth century
military governor of Walachia (present day Romania), Vlad III (the Impaler), a Christian
despot who sought to terrify his foes with graphic acts of mutilation to slain enemies, which
included drinking their blood. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Vampire (2010), available at
http://www.britannica.com/bps/search?query=vampire; ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Vlad III
(2010), available at http://www.britannica.com/bps/search?query=vlad+the+impaler.
98.
Kristofer Widholm & Bernard McGinn, Antichrist: An Interview with Bernard
McGinn,
CABINET
MAGAZINE,
5
Winter
2001-02,
available
at
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/5/widholm.php (describing the Antichrist as Satan
incarnate “within the context of Christian belief, where Jesus is not only the messiah, but
also God come to earth, that the Antichrist figure emerges as the flip side of the coin, so to
speak”).
99.
See Widholm & McGinn, supra note 98.
100.
See id.
101.
See Ephesians 1:7 (New Oxford) (“In [Jesus Christ] we have redemption
through his blood.”); Revelation 5:9 (New Oxford) (singing to Jesus Christ, “for though was
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Pagan beliefs, because it unnaturally refutes the cycle of life and death.102
Therefore, vampirism has no correlation to Neo-Paganism.
Another common misconception about Neo-Paganism, the practice of
human and animal sacrifice, derives from Rome before it was an Empire.103
The Romans, under General Julius Caesar and his military and imperial
successors, led a notorious smear campaign against the indigenous beliefs
of the Celts, primarily the druids because they were the academic, legal,
spiritual, and medical core of Celtic society.104 To accuse the elite minds of
Celtic society of human sacrifice was a way to rationalize the conquest and
Romanization of these uncivilized savages.105
The pre-Christian Romans made similar accusations against the early
Christians, claiming they sacrificed babies to obtain blood for communion.106 Ironically, when Christianity became the state religion of Rome, the
Christians took up the persecution of the druids, because Christians then
“had a vested interest in blackening the picture they painted of the druids
and in denouncing practices they deemed contrary to their own.”107 Another
irony is that the Romans advocated the mortal confrontation of thousands of
humans and animals for the sake of entertainment in the Colosseum,108 yet
maligned the alleged religious killing of humans and animals in Celtic society.
While early pagans certainly practiced animal sacrifice as a symbolic
offering for the good graces of their deity(ies),109 this is akin to early Western orthodox practices.110 Similarly, while it is debatable whether the ancient druids or other early pagans ever practiced human sacrifice or whether
sacrifice was symbolic only,111 the dogma of human sacrifice is also deeply

slain and by thy blood didst ransom men for God from every tribe and tongue and people
and nation”).
102.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 155 (“[T]he pagan way is not a path of grieving about death. [Neo-Pagans] embrace death as a part of the never-ending cycle of life.”).
103.
JEAN MARKALE, THE DRUIDS: CELTIC PRIESTS OF NATURE 159-63 (1999).
104.
Id. at 4-10, 160-61.
105.
Id. at 159-63.
106.
Id. at 161.
107.
Id. at 160.
108.
See Colosseum, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/colosseum (last
visited Oct. 11, 2010).
109.
See MARKALE, supra note 103, at 159.
110.
E.g., Exodus 12:5-6 (New Oxford) (proclaiming the Passover ritual: “Your lamb
shall be without blemish . . . you shall keep it until the fourteenth day of this month; when
the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill their lambs in the evening.”).
111.
See MARKALE, supra note 103, at 159 (suggesting Druidic sacrifice was symbolic only and similar to how “the Catholic Mass is a memorization of a bloody ritual by
which humanity, in the person of Jesus, surpassed its original mortal state and transcended
itself to the divine plane through death and rebirth.”).
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ingrained in orthodox religions.112 Therefore, it is difficult to discern that
the sacrifices of ancient pagans were any more real or vicious than those of
other ancient religions still extant.
Yet, the inaccurate associations of paganism with reprehensible behavior extended beyond the Roman Empire, and reached into medieval Europe
with misconceptions that lingered into the Colonial era,113 eventually bleeding into the new world.114 “The Great Witch Hunt” occurred from the late
fifteenth to mid seventeenth centuries in Europe,115 continuing for another
half century in colonial America.116 Yet again, an undeniable irony exists in
that an estimated 40,000-100,000 people were brutally killed in the name of
Christendom, typically by burning, and many were not even accused of
harming anyone.117 The Salem Witch Trials of the late seventeenth-century
epitomize what can best be described as the religiocentric pandemonium of
a fearfully puritanical society.118 Rationality yielded to paranoia, and in
some cases, opportunism, as the plurality of Salem’s community persecuted
its own people with ridiculous accusations of hexing pregnant mothers and
flying on broomsticks at night to expedite their voyage to meet with Satan
in orgiastic rituals.119
Regardless of ancient practices and historical accusations, contemporary Neo-Pagans do not dignify live sacrifice in their practice.120 While ritualistic tools of Neo-Paganism may include a knife, referred to as an athame,
this device “is not used for any physical tasks,” such as cutting, because it

112.
See Genesis 22:2 (New Oxford) (“Take your son, your only son Isaac, whom
you love, and . . . offer him there as a burnt offering upon one of the mountains that I shall
tell you”); see also MARKALE, supra note 103, at 159.
113.
See JONES & PENNICK, supra note 64, at 196-207.
114.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 48.
115.
JONES & PENNICK, supra note 64, at 204.
116.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 48-49.
117.
See JONES & PENNICK, supra note 64, at 204-07; BARNER-BARRY, supra note
19, at 48 (referring to a sixteenth century demonologist who advocated death to any witch,
even if the witch had done nothing but good things for others).
118.
See GEORGE H. MOORE, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON WITCHCRAFT IN
MASSACHUSETTS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGED LAW OF 1711 FOR REVERSING
THE ATTAINDERS OF THE WITCHES OF 1692 (University Press 1884) (detailing Massachusetts’s legal efforts to pardon and recompense the families of individuals who were wrongly
accused of statutory witchcraft); Tim Sutter, Salem Witchcraft: The Events and Causes of the
Salem Witch Trials, http://www.salemwitchtrials.com/salemwitchcraft.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2010).
119.
See JONES & PENNICK, supra note 64, at 207; Sutter, supra note 118 (recounting
how 20 people in a community of approximately 600 were put to death for witchcraft, and
how 200 or 33% were imprisoned for accusations of witchcraft).
120.
See FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 35 (invoking these words in ritual: “Nor do I
demand sacrifice, for behold, I am the Mother of all things, and My love is poured out upon
the Earth.”).
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could compromise its positive energy.121 The concept of taking the life of a
living being for anything less than physical necessity is antithetical to NeoPagans:
[A]ny attempt to modify the natural world should be undertaken . . . with a sense of reverence for the subject of [the]
change . . . . Often cited is a Native American practice of
explaining to a freshly killed animal the necessity to take
its meat and skin for food and clothing . . . . It cannot be
done thoughtlessly or frivolously.122
Because Neo-Paganism pays such reverence to living beings, Neo-Pagans
frequently opt to be vegetarians or choose diets low in meat intake.123
An unjustified paradox exists in that Neo-Pagans strongly oppose the
sadistic beliefs underlying Satanism, vampirism, devil-worship, and live
sacrifice, yet Neo-Paganism is prevalently associated with these unrelated
forms of practice. Such misconceptions fuel an array of tribulations for
Neo-Pagans in the legal system, most evidently the judge and jury’s possible prejudice against a Neo-Pagan who may serve as a plaintiff, a defendant, a victim, or a witness. The potential prejudicial impact is only controllable if the court properly recognizes Neo-Paganism as a valid religion at
the onset of the case.
D.

THE RISE OF NEO-PAGANISM IN AMERICA

While it is impossible to say with precision the number of Neo-Pagans
in the United States today, most credible sources estimate that NeoPaganism numerically rivals some notable religions, and that NeoPaganism has a faster growing base than all orthodox religions.124 There are
three main reasons for the difficulty in precisely measuring Neo-Pagan
121.
FIREMOON, supra note 18, at 67.
122.
BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 34.
123.
See Sarah White, Faith-Based Diet, Wiccan-Style, CALORIELAB (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://calorielab.com/news/2006/10/30/faith-based-diet-wiccan-style (“In a way eating is a
spiritual practice and it’s likely there are more vegetarians and vegans (or even just people
who eat organic foods) among pagans than are in the general population, though a special
diet is far from required.”); See also Goodman v. Snyder, No. 00-C-0948, 2003 WL
22765047, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2003) (holding a Wiccan prisoner asserted a valid
claim against Illinois Department of Corrections because the plaintiff was not provided a
vegetarian diet in accordance with his beliefs).
124.
See, e.g., American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), GRAD.
CENTER OF THE CITY UNIV. OF NEW YORK, available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/Faculty/GCFaculty-Activities/ARIS--American-Religious-Identification-Survey/Key-findings; Pagans
Go Mainstream: Wiccans and Druids and Goddesses—Oh, My!, RELIGION LINK,
http://www.religionlink.com/tip_091020.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
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practitioners. First, our country does not obtain religious information in its
census data, so there is no truly centralized or all-encompassing method to
obtain religious information.125 Second, the specific mainstream stigma of
being labeled a “witch” or “pagan” has caused many practitioners to remain
in the broom closet; therefore any survey may be under-inclusive of actual
Neo-Pagan practitioners.126 There is also a contrasting problem that those
who label themselves as one subset, such as “Wiccan,” may also label
themselves as “Neo-Pagan,” thereby overinflating the numbers.127
Despite these challenges, a number of groups such as the American
Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) gather and analyze religious information through surveys, and have created estimates of Neo-Paganism based
on the raw statistics and projected variances for the known potential discrepancies.128 Perhaps the most striking statistic is the precipitous increase
in Wiccan and Neo-Pagan adult practitioners, rising from 8000 in 1990, to
274,000 in 2001, to 682,000 in 2008.129 ReligiousTolerance.org adjusts
these numbers down by 25% to account for the number of Wiccans who
also label themselves as Neo-Pagan, and then increases by 200% to account
for those who do not “feel sufficiently safe and secure to tell their real religion.”130 Following the ReligiousTolerance.org formula, there would be just
over 1,000,000 adult practitioners based on the raw ARIS survey numbers
in 2008.131 This estimate is also roughly corroborated by Circle Sanctuary’s
range of Neo-Pagan practitioners in 2006.132
125.
See American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note 124.
126.
See supra Part II.B.
127.
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/wic_nbr3.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2010).
128.
See, e.g., American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note
124; “Boo” Who? Pagans and Christians Celebrate Halloween, but Differently, RELIGION
LINK, http://www.religionlink.com/topic_101028.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); RELIGIOUS
TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/wic_nbr3.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
129.
See the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note 124;
Pagans Go Mainstream: Wiccans and Druids and Goddesses—Oh, My!, RELIGION LINK,
http://www.religionlink.com/tip_091020.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
130.
How Many Wiccans Are There?: Estimates for the U.S. and Canada, RELIGIOUS
TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/wic_nbr3.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
131.
See American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note 124;
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/wic_nbr3.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2010). There was also an American Religious Identification Survey done in 2008, however
this ARIS study did not provide the same level of detailed information concerning NeoPagan religions and instead lumped them together with other minority religious groups. See
American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008), TRINITY COLLEGE, available at
http://b27.cc.trincoll.edu/weblogs/AmericanReligionSurvey-ARIS/reports/p1a_belong.html.
132.
Wiccans Battle VA Over Veteran Grave Marker Symbol, CIRCLE SANCTUARY,
http://www.circlesanctuary.org/liberty/veteranpentacle/aldagarticle.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2010) (“Sociologists and other scholars have estimated that between 250,000 and one million Americans [in 2006] are members of the Wiccan religion and other forms of contempo-
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If there are indeed 1,000,000 adult Neo-Pagan practitioners, NeoPaganism has become as comparably widespread as Hinduism in the United
States, but with a much faster growth rate.133 If Neo-Paganism continues at
a similar growth rate for the next decade, Neo-Paganism could outnumber
any orthodox religion, except Christianity,134 and become one of the most
prevalent religions in the United States. Neo-Paganism may already have
more followers than many recognizable denominations of Christianity, such
as Seventh Day Adventist, Eastern Orthodox, Mennonite, and Christian
Science.135
Religious views are ultimately unique to each individual, and as such,
the number of practitioners should not matter as applied to each person’s
liberty interest in religious freedom. However, the number is significant in
two ways. First, the number of legal actions involving Neo-Paganism will
likely increase with the increased number of Neo-Pagan practitioners. As
such, the uniform acceptance and treatment of Neo-Paganism as a valid
religion by courts will ensure consistency and judicial efficiency. Second,
the United States’ reluctance to embrace the incorrectly stigmatized NeoPagan religion is a lingering and increasingly visible eyesore in our nation’s
promise to provide religious liberty.136
III.

NEO-PAGANISM IS A VALID RELIGIOUS BELIEF

This section will first summarize the history of religious freedom in
the United States, focusing on the First Amendment’s Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses.137 Next, the definition of religion is explored, prirary Paganism.”) (This number is within the same rough range estimated by the other organizations before factoring in variable adjustments); See, e.g., American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note 124; “Boo” Who? Pagans and Christians Celebrate
Halloween, but Differently, RELIGION LINK, http://www.religionlink.com/topic_101028.php
(last
visited
Nov.
8,
2010);
RELIGIOUS
TOLERANCE,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/wic_nbr3.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
133.
See Hinduism: The World’s Third Largest Religion, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hinduism.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
134.
See generally American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra
note 124 (following the growth trend from 1990-2001 for these denominations indicates that
they had less than one million followers in 2010).
135.
See generally American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra
note 124 (showing that Christianity is the majority religion in the United States with 76.5%
of the American population claiming Christian beliefs in 2001. Interestingly, it is the group
with no religious belief that comprises 14.1% of the population—the second most adherents
in the survey).
136.
See Trans World Airline, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 (1977) (Marshall, J.
dissenting) (“[O]ne of this Nation’s pillars of strength [is]—our hospitality to religious diversity . . . .”).
137.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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marily by extrapolating the Supreme Court’s interpretation.138 Using the
Court’s definition of religion, Neo-Paganism is then evaluated to demonstrate that it is a valid religious belief system and is thus protected by the
First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom.139 A few cases are
examined to show correct and incorrect acceptance of Neo-Pagan beliefs by
different courts.140
A.

HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA

Religious freedom is a broad term that encompasses the two divergent
and sometimes competing clauses contained in the First Amendment:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”141 The impetus for the inclusion
of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause into the Bill of
Rights was to prevent the repetition of “persecutions, generated in large part
by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy . . . .”142 In other words, the framers perceived a political
threat in religious majoritarianism.143 Therefore, the intention was to create
a nation that was not religiously homogenous or nonreligious, but one that
welcomed and embraced diverse religions coextensively.144
The two Clauses provide a delicate balance point between tolerance
for individuals to practice their religious beliefs and separation of church
and state.145 Extensive legal history and academic research has debated the
nuanced scope of each Clause and how to resolve issues when the Clauses

138.
See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965).
139.
See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87; Seeger, 380 U.S. at 167.
140.
E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Roberts v. Ravenwood Church
of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. 1982).
141.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphases added).
142.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson is also considered to be the
case in which the Supreme Court incorporated the religious clauses as fundamental rights
applicable to the states by way of the “Liberty” Clause of the 14th Amendment. Arguments
have been made that the Establishment Clause was never intended to apply to the States. See
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1251-52 (Foundation Press 16th ed. (2007)).
143.
See Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
144.
Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (“We live in a pluralistic society. Our citizens come from diverse religious traditions or adhere to no particular religious beliefs at all. If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than showing either favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based on their personal religious choices, government cannot endorse the religious
practices and beliefs of some citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders or less than full members of the political community.”).
145.
Id.
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overlap.146 The Supreme Court’s decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, however, summarized the interplay between the Establishment Clause’s “freedom to believe” and the Free Exercise Clause’s “freedom to act” astutely:147
“The first is absolute but . . . the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection.”148
Understanding that religious based conduct could possibly cause injury to
other citizens or the government, the Court sagaciously reserved some
power to regulate acts of religion when necessary and in such a way that
does not “unduly . . . infringe the protected freedom.”149
So while religious freedom, like most fundamental rights, is not absolute, any intentional government interference with religious practices must
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.150
Even though the First Amendment’s religious protections might seem
to put a true wall between church and state, the tendrils stemming from
religion have had an undeniable impact on many aspects of our nation’s
history. Rhode Island, for example, was settled and eventually became a
sovereign state because Quakers and other religious minorities wanted their
own community away from an overwhelmingly Catholic Massachusetts.151
American’s westward expansion during the nineteenth century was predicated in part on Manifest Destiny, a concept that is inextricably linked to
religion: “There was a widely held underlying belief that Americans, the
‘chosen people,’ had a divinely inspired mission to spread the fruits of their
democracy to the less fortunate (usually meaning Native Americans and
other non-Europeans).”152
Significantly, the nineteenth-century also ushered in many additions of
“ceremonial deism” that the Court has consistently held do not violate the
146.
See, e.g., id.; Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); William Van
Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall—A Comment on
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770.
147.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
148.
Id. at 303-04.
149.
Id. at 304.
150.
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (striking down a city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice because it was designed
to single out Santerian religious practices and was not narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding state law prohibiting
minors from publicly selling written materials even though it conflicted with proscribed duty
of Jehovah’s Witness faith, because child welfare and not religious practice was the target of
the legislation).
151.
Rickie Lazzerini, The History of Rhode Island, KINDRED TRAILS (2006),
http://www.kindredtrails.com/Rhode_Island_History-1.html.
152.
Dawn
Taylor,
Manifest
Destiny,
TIMETOAST
(2011),
http://www.timetoast.com/timelines/70344; accord Manifest Destiny, U.S. HISTORY,
http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h337.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
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Establishment Clause.153 Prominently, “In God We Trust” began being
placed on U.S. currency in 1864. 154 The Court traced its own session opening remark, “God save the United States and this honorable Court,” to
1827.155 Ceremonial deism expanded further in the twentieth century.156
Congress made “In God We Trust”157 the national motto while adding “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance.158 These references to a deity have
been tolerated by the Court, because they are viewed as not pervasive and
do not promote a particular religion.159
Dissenting Supreme Court Justices have argued in various ways that
symbols and references specific to Christianity by government actors may
be constitutional.160 Justice Kennedy has argued that the Christian roots of
our nation are inextricably tied to our national history.161 Justice Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, White, and Scalia referenced numerous
examples of historical state actions and legislation that would justify a
much narrower application of the Establishment Clause and more broadly
allow for the observance of Christian or even Jewish religious holidays by
governmental entities.162
The Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter holding, however, was that a government body may not have holiday displays endorsing particular religions, such as a Catholic crèche.163
Justice Blackmun’s lead opinion rejected the notion that any religion receives preference because of the nation’s history:

153.
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
154.
Id. at 29.
155.
Id. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
156.
Id.
157.
Act of July 30, 1956, ch. 795, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. §
302 (2006)).
158.
Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 349 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4
(2006)).
159.
See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 36-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
160.
See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburg
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding despite four dissents that display of a religious symbol by a city government is an Establishment Clause violation).
161.
Id. at 671-75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).
162.
Id. at 655-75 (including statements made by presidents going back to George
Washington that reference “God” and the almost ubiquitous belief in Christianity or Judaism).
163.
Compare id. at 601-02, and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that
display of the Ten Commandments in public schools was an Establishment Clause violation), with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that displaying a Christmas tree
and Santa Claus was not an Establishment Clause violation because displays were nonreligious).
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Perhaps in the early days of the Republic these words were
understood to protect only the diversity within Christianity,
but today they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to “the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent
of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.” It is settled law that no government official in this Nation may violate these fundamental constitutional rights regarding matters of conscience.164
Having determined that the Court views all religions as equal under
the Constitution, Neo-Paganism is entitled to constitutional protection so
long as it is a valid religion. The next question, therefore, is whether NeoPaganism constitutes a valid religious belief system.
B.

NEO-PAGANISM COMPORTS WITH LEGAL DEFINITION OF A VALID
RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Two twentieth century Supreme Court cases provide much of the
foundation for analyzing what is a constitutionally recognized religious
belief: United States v. Ballard165 and United States v. Seeger.166 Applying
these principles to Neo-Pagan belief systems demonstrates how NeoPaganism is a valid religion which must be given the same constitutional
protections as orthodox religious beliefs.
Ballard contains some of the Court’s richest language defining religious beliefs and explains why a court must examine the sincerity of an individual’s belief to be dispositive instead of examining “the truth or verity of
[an individual’s] religious doctrines or beliefs.”167 The Court in Ballard
dictated that religious beliefs may not be discounted simply because an
onlooker finds the religion unbelievable.168 As Justice Douglas explained,
“religious views espoused . . . might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.”169 Justice Douglas’s opinion established that factfinder determinations of the validity of a religion would destroy our coun-

164.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52
(1985)).
165.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
166.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
167.
See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 85-88.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 87 (explaining that Christian doctrine, including “[t]he miracles of the
New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer” could be discounted by a jury).
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try’s notion of religious freedom.170 Perhaps most poignantly Douglas
specified that “[t]he First Amendment does not select any one group . . . for
preferred treatment” because an individual’s “relation to . . . God was made
no concern of the state.”171
Building off of the Ballard holding that the veracity of an individual’s
religious belief “cannot be questioned,”172 Seeger explicated a broad interpretation of religion not exclusive to belief in an orthodox God: “the test of
belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”173 Thus, all honest beliefs in
matters of divinity and spirituality are accepted as valid religious beliefs,174
and the Court has only exempted beliefs that are “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code”175
while still liberally including nonreligious but strongly held ethical and
moral beliefs that “function as a religion.”176
Neo-Paganism comports with the Supreme Court’s definition of religious belief primarily because practitioners hold a sincere belief in the
mechanisms of a higher power—a Mother Goddess, elements of nature, and
an interconnected universe.177 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has
never explicitly evaluated Neo-Paganism under its definition of religion, it
did implicitly accept Neo-Paganism as a valid belief system in Cutter v.
Wilkinson.178 In Cutter, the Court reviewed a cause of action of prison inmates of various religious beliefs, including Wicca and Asatru,179 under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.180 At no point did the
Court reject the listed religious beliefs as invalid.181
Considering the Court’s openness to unorthodox religious beliefs, specifically beliefs that “are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths,”182
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 87-88.
172.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
173.
Id. at 165-66.
174.
See id.
175.
See id.
176.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (including “deeply and
sincerely [held] beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience . . .”); James H. Mansfield, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV.
847, 851 (1984) (analyzing in further detail the inclusion and exclusion of non-religious
philosophies).
177.
See supra Part II.A.
178.
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712-13 (2005).
179.
Id. at 712.
180.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
181.
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712-13.
182.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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it is interesting that some members of the judiciary have continued to assert
objections to Neo-Paganism as a valid religion. Georgia’s Chief Justice
Jordan dissented in Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca from the majority’s holding that Wicca was a religion, stating “the Wiccan faith does not
meet [the Seeger] test.”183 Jordan’s rationale attacked Wiccan belief on the
basis that it has no belief in an “anthropomorphic God.”184 Such a narrow
definition of religion flies in the face of Seeger’s holding that unequivocally
stated that religious beliefs are not to be limited to traditional orthodox beliefs in God.185
Other examples of judicial reluctance to accept Neo-Paganism as a
valid religious belief include Arkansas appellate court’s holding in Hicks v.
Cook that denigrated Wicca by stating, “One final concern is her testimony
regarding the WICCA religion, movement, cult or whatever that may be . . .
. That is no joking matter.”186 Also, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
holding in State v. Theer allowed the defendant’s “alleged practice of
Wicca[]” as acceptable character evidence while never explaining how
Wicca was relevant to the charged crime.187 Hicks and Theer will be examined in detail, along with other cases, to demonstrate how courts continue to
unconstitutionally apply impermissible prejudices against Neo-Paganism in
various contexts.188
IV.

DENIAL OF PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED ON NEO-PAGAN BELIEFS

An Indiana trial court decision emerged in 2004 which actualized the
greatest fear of many Neo-Pagan parents—that their parental rights to raise
a child in accordance with their personal beliefs could not coexist with their
Neo-Pagan faith.189 The trial court in Jones v. Jones specifically decreed
that both parents were not to expose their child to their “non-mainstream
[Neo-Pagan] religious beliefs.”190 In 2005, the Indiana Court of Appeals
quelled the panic by striking down the lower court’s decree.191 However,
183.
Roberts v. Ravenwood Church of Wicca, 292 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Ga. 1982).
184.
Id.
185.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
186.
Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
187.
State v. Theer, 639 S.E.2d 655, 663-64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (including other
character evidence, the court accepted to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake[,] . . . her sexual promiscuity and
affairs[,] . . . her ‘alternative’ lifestyle[,] . . . ‘swinging[,]’ . . . and her ability to manipulate
others, particularly men”) (referencing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (equivalent to
the Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) standard)).
188.
See infra Parts IV, VI.
189.
See Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
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for Neo-Pagan religious practitioners, the trial court’s animosity towards
Neo-Paganism found in Jones192 recurs in various state courts and similar
custodial contexts, although typically in a more clandestine fashion.193
Explicit animosity to Neo-Paganism is in some ways preferable, because it is more easily recognized and corrected by a higher court, as in
Jones.194 A more insidious problem occurs when the prejudice against NeoPaganism is shrouded in the pretext of legitimacy, because the burden shifts
to the party who was discriminated against to show there was clear judicial
error—a standard which is very difficult to meet.195
The first subsection will examine the legal history of parental rights
from foundational Supreme Court decisions, as well as how the state court
framed the Jones decision.196 Next, the Hicks v. Cook197 decision is analyzed at length to extract the prejudice against Neo-Paganism which was
tolerated by an Arkansas appellate court, despite strong dissenting opinions.
Finally, other contemporary decisions that involve Neo-Pagan custodial
rights are analyzed to suggest how courts continue to apply prejudice
against Neo-Pagans in parental custody cases.
A.

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND THE JONES V. JONES BACKDROP

The fundamental right of parents to raise their children in accordance
with their own beliefs has been supported by the Supreme Court as a substantive liberty guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment since as early
as 1923 in Meyer v. Nebraska198 and in later decisions.199 Indiana explicitly
echoed Meyer in Swartz v. Swartz when it asserted that “[p]arents have a
constitutionally recognized fundamental right to control the upbringing,
education, and religious training of their children.”200 If any doubt remained
about the fundamental right of parents to instill their own religious beliefs
in their children, the Indiana Code also unequivocally expressed in its di192.
Id.
193.
See generally Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
194.
See Jones, 832 N.E.2d at 1060-61.
195.
See, e.g., State v. Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890 (Kan. 2001).
196.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-402 (1923); Jones, 832 N.E.2d at 1060-61.
197.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d 244.
198.
See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-402 (holding that due process includes an individual’s “freedom . . . to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience . . .”); see
also Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296 (incorporating the First Amendment’s “free exercise” clause as
a fundamental right of all citizens of all states).
199.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11, 216-17 (1972) (allowing
Amish parents to not send their children to public school after the eighth grade because the
parents’ religious beliefs were implicated).
200.
Swartz v. Swartz, 720 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
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vorce statute: “the custodian may determine the child’s upbringing, including the child's education, health care, and religious training.”201
Despite the statutory language and mandatory precedents, the Indiana
trial court in Jones v. Jones erroneously decreed that both divorcing parents
must desist from exposing their child to their mutually shared Wiccan beliefs: “The following specific term [] shall [] apply to both parties: . . . That
the parents are directed to take such steps as are needed to shelter [the
child] from involvement and observation of these non-mainstream [Wiccan]
religious beliefs and rituals . . . .”202
The trial court not only refused to dignify Neo-Paganism as a valid religion—in fact the court refused to dignify Wicca by name—but the court
further denigrated it by framing the child’s exposure to a religion that “people might think [involves] Satan” as an impairment to the well-being of the
child.203 In other words the trial court trumped the well-established and
fundamental right of the parents to raise their children with their religious
beliefs under the guise of a significant concern for the child’s physical or
emotional health.204
By the court’s misguided logic, a judge could presumably restrict a
parent from raising their children Jewish if they lived in an area prone to
anti-Semitism or conceivably restrict the Protestant upbringing of a child in
a predominately Catholic neighborhood, because the child might be ridiculed or accosted due to her religious beliefs.205 Taken to the extreme, such
restrictions on religious beliefs could result in courts in every state refusing
to allow the upbringing of a child in any religion other than the state,
county, or municipality’s majority religion or denomination, based on how
the court subjectively applies its discretion.206
The appellate court did correctly identify the trial court’s error and
struck down the religious limitation in the decree, although the reversal was
predicated on statutory, not constitutional, grounds.207 The appellate court
found that the trial court abused its discretion and failed to specify a valid
health concern of the child that could justify the decree’s religious limitation.208 While the appellate court corrected what was an egregious misap201.
IND. CODE § 31-17-2-17(a)(2) (2005) (excepting only situations that would
impair the physical or emotional well-being of the child).
202.
Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
203.
Id. at 1060.
204.
See id. at 1060-61.
205.
See id.
206.
Id.
207.
Jones, 832 N.E.2d at 1059-61 (holding that a constitutional issue will not be
addressed if the issue can be resolved statutorily).
208.
Id. at 1061 (“Although the trial court does not specify what is meant by ‘these
non-mainstream religious beliefs and rituals,’ we can infer that this refers to the Wiccan
beliefs and rituals discussed by both parents in their testimony. The trial court's inclusion of
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plication of judicial authority by the trial court based on prejudice against
Neo-Paganism,209 religious prejudice, like most forms of discrimination,
rarely appears in such a facially recognizable form.
A curious series of questions arises in the wake of Jones: What if only
one of the parents, both seeking custody, was Wiccan? The trial court
delved into the religious beliefs and practices of each parent before ultimately awarding the father custody with the religious limitation.210 Might
the trial court have awarded the mother custody had she been a Christian or
even an atheist? What would this court have done if a non-custodial parent
who is not Neo-Pagan sought custody from a custodial parent who is a NeoPagan but may require medication for emotional stability? These questions
will be explored next.
B.

PARENTAL FITNESS OR RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE? THE IMPLICATIONS OF
HICKS V. COOK

Hicks v. Cook reveals how a court’s prejudice against Neo-Paganism
can result in a parent losing custody of a child under the color of law.211 In
2008, a divided Arkansas appellate court upheld the granting of a father’s
petition to take custody away from a mother, prompted by an isolated incident of the illegitimate child being dirty and allegedly having minor dog
bites.212 Evidence considered in the trial also included the mother’s mental
health and her involvement in “the Wicca[n] religion,” which the mother
actually denied even though she displayed considerable knowledge about
Wicca.213
A close examination of the facts and a comparison to similar custodial
decisions involving parents who were not Neo-Pagans demonstrates that the
Hicks decision was impermissibly based on religious prejudice and not on
the best interest of the child or parental fitness.214 Each of the nonreligious
factors the court considered in Hicks: the physical condition of the child,
the mental health of the mother, and the fitness of the father, are not sufficient, individually or in the aggregate, to warrant the mother losing custody
of her child.215
this term in the Decree would appear to reflect the judge's personal opinion of the parties'
Wiccan beliefs and rituals.”).
209.
See id.
210.
Id. at 1059-61.
211.
See Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
212.
Id.
213.
Id. at 246, 253 (explaining to the judge that “she only told the father she was
practicing Wicca, but that she was really a Baptist.” The mother further explained, “Wicca
was an earth based religion that had gods and goddesses and believed in doing good”).
214.
See id. at 244-49.
215.
See id.
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The Arkansas Code presumes custody for the mother of a child born
out of wedlock.216 The biological father may seek custody if: (1) he is considered a fit parent, (2) who has substantively provided for the child, and
(3) it is deemed in the best interest of the child.217 The best interest of the
child is considered the primary consideration.218 In Hicks, both parties
agreed that the father met the first two elements, and so the best interest of
the child was the critical issue.219 A look at other Arkansas custody cases
establishes that the best interest element oftentimes, as here, pivots on a
determination of the mother’s fitness as a parent because the father’s fitness
is already recognized.220 Yet the Hicks court deviated from established
standards set forth in precedents to rule the mother unfit to provide for the
best interest of the child, belying its prejudice against Neo-Paganism.221
1.

The Pretextual Foundations Used to Strip the Mother of Custody

Examining the best interest of the child in Hicks, the trial court expressed a concern with “the mother’s ability to raise the child in a safe and
nurturing manner.”222 The specific concerns the father reported based on the
single incident were that the child had diaper rash, dirty nails, earwax,
something dirty or fungal on his face, and possibly minimal dog bite
wounds on his shoulder.223 At first blush, this accumulation of sanitary
breakdowns might suggest neglectful parenting by the mother.
However, as one dissent pointed out: the fingernails, diaper rash, and
earwax are “not unusual with a toddler;” and a child being dirty and having

216.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-113(a) (2007).
217.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-113(c) (2007).
218.
Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2003); see also Sheppard v. Speir, 157
S.W.3d 583, 590 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (stating six factors for determining the best interest of
the child: “(1) the child's preference; (2) the effect of the change of the child's surname on
the preservation and development of the child's relationship with each parent; (3) the length
of time the child has borne a given name; (4) the degree of community respect associated
with the present and proposed surnames; (5) the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment
that the child may experience from bearing the present or proposed surname; (6) the existence of any parental misconduct or neglect”) (citing Huffman v. Fisher, 987 S.W.2d 269
(Ark. 1999)).
219.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 246-47.
220.
See Sykes v. Warren, 258 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (clarifying that
“the trial court d[oes] not have to find [the mother] unfit in order to grant custody . . . to [the]
father. Once [the father] show[s] to the satisfaction of the trial court that he [is] a fit parent
and [has] taken responsibility for his child, the trial court [is] left solely to make a bestinterest determination”).
221.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 246-47.
222.
See id. at 246.
223.
Id. at 245-46.
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a dog bite is not in itself proof of neglect.224 Considering that none of the
child’s conditions required medical attention or were medically evaluated, it
becomes difficult to reconcile the majority’s willingness to change custody
in Hicks based on physical well-being with the same court’s unwillingness
to alter custody in Carver v. May when some evidence suggested a father
was molesting his daughters but the court deferred to a lack of medical substantiation.225
A mother had lost custody in Carver for “extreme animosity” towards
her ex-husband which made his continued visitation with the children almost impossible, and so the court determined the father-child relationships
could only be sustained by granting him custody.226 Despite the mother’s
proclivity to incorrectly accuse the father of various misdeeds, there was
compelling evidence that the daughters had been subjected to sexual abuse
by the father, which the mother also claimed.227 A child therapist’s examination revealed that one daughter claimed that “daddy touched me and my
sister,” pointing to her genitals.228 An educational assistant stated that the
younger daughter seemed upset after spending time with her father and
started “shaking and crying when her diaper was being changed.”229 However, the Arkansas appellate court refused to disturb the father’s custody for
this reason, because a medical examination could not substantiate sexual
abuse.230
Part of the duplicity of the Arkansas Appellate Court is that in Carver,
the court accepted the medical exam as dispositive that the father was not
an unfit parent while disregarding evidence from other relevant testimony,
but in Hicks the court accepted a lay opinion of the father regarding scant
accusations of filth and non-medical diagnoses as dispositive of the
mother’s unfitness.231 As a dissenter elucidated, there were disputed facts as
to the alleged conditions the child suffered in Hicks to suggest the mother
was very fit.232 For example, the mother “was treating the rash with a topical ointment [and] . . . the so-called [dog] ‘wound’ on [the child] was likely
just a bug bite, as [the mother] hypothesized.”233 Why did the court in
Carver only appear willing to upend existing custody if the parent’s unfit224.
Id. at 254-55 (Heffley, J., dissenting).
225.
Carver v. May, 101 S.W.3d 256, 260-61 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
226.
Id. at 258-59 (detailing an incident where the mother called the police to arrest
the father for drug possession as he was trying to exercise his visitation rights—the father
was not found to have drugs on him).
227.
Id. at 260-61.
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Carver, 101 S.W.3d at 260-61.
231.
Id.; Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244, 246-49 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
232.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 254 (Hart, J., dissenting).
233.
Id.
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ness could be medically substantiated,234 whereas in Hicks the court appeared complicit to strip a mother of custody at least partially based on disputed medical diagnoses from the father?235
Another irreconcilable inconsistency in the court’s decision in Hicks is
the relatively minor nature and degree of the alleged physical harm to the
child when compared to more extreme and evidenced harm to children by
parents who do not suffer as drastic of legal consequences.236 Logic and
Arkansas case law dictate that the frequency and severity of adverse physical conditions must be considered when determining parental fitness. For
example, in Henry ex rel. Phillips v. Henry, the court only took temporary
custody away from a child’s parents despite medical testimony that the infant was anemic and overweight due to an improper diet, and despite several witnesses testifying that the father “frequently left the baby dirty,” including a doctor’s testimony that the child’s skin was sticky because he not
been bathed.237
Unlike the father’s report against the mother in Hicks that was based
on one incident out of numerous visitations he had with the child, the father
in Henry exhibited a pattern of not attending to basic health and sanitary
needs of the child.238 However, despite the more frequent and extreme disregard of the parent in Henry the court anticipated that the father could regain custody by only awarding temporary custody to the mother’s parents,
whereas in Hicks the mother lost permanent custody rights of her child.239
Following Arkansas case law, the rationale for removing the mother’s custody in Hicks based on the best interest of the child must have been for a
reason other than the alleged physical condition of the child.
Next, the Hicks court’s erroneous reasoning about the mother’s mental
health will be examined to expose how the majority exceeded its judicial
limitations, once again honing in on the discriminatory reason underpinning
the decision.240 The court made two errors on the mental health subject that
are irreconcilable with proper jurisprudence. First, there was no allegation
that the mother was prone to improper behavior due to her “depression and
anxiety” that would render her unfit as a parent.241 Second, no medical expert correlated her mental health with the need to take prescriptive medi234.
Carver, 101 S.W.3d at 260-61.
235.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 244-46.
236.
Id., compare with Henry ex rel. Phillips v. Henry, No. CA 85-470, 1986 WL
3694, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986).
237.
Phillips, No. CA 85-470, 1986 WL 3694, at *1.
238.
Compare Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 244-46, with Henry, No. CA 85-470, 1986 WL
3694, at *1-2.
239.
Compare Henry, No. CA 85-470, 1986 WL 3694 at *1-2, with Hicks, 288 S.W.
3d at 244-46.
240.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 244-46.
241.
Id. at 244-46, 253.
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cine.242 In so finding the mother was unfit based in part on her failure to
medicate her alleged mental ailments, the court impermissibly assumed the
roles of doctor and opposing counsel.243
The undisputed facts of the mother’s mental health in Hicks are as follows: she had previously been diagnosed and treated for anxiety and depression.244 At the time of the trial the father introduced evidence of the
mother’s recent prescriptions that she did not feel she needed to take.245
Aside from the existence of the prescriptions, no evidence was presented
and no specific allegation was made that her mental condition, with or
without medication, made her prone to “behavior inconsistent with the best
interest of the child.”246 The court nevertheless concluded that “the child
would be much better off if the mother took medications.”247
On the same day that Hicks was decided, the Arkansas appellate
court—with three of the same majority/concurring judges of the six on
panel from the Hicks decision—decided a mother’s custody appeal of her
child born out of wedlock in Sharp v. Keeler.248 In Sharp, the mother appealed the granting of her four year old son’s custody to his father, stemming from an appellate decision of the same name, the prior year.249 The
mother lost custody of her son for a litany of acts primarily rooted in her
severely inimical relationship with the child’s father.250 The court correctly
affirmed that the mother’s actions were detrimental to the child’s best interest and that the father should have custody.251 Yet, the court also reversed
the requirement for supervised visitation due to the mother’s mental state,
despite an inconclusive psychological evaluation that suggested that she
might have “significant and pervasive emotional problems.”252 Therefore,
even in a case where the mother was vindictively pawning her child’s

242.
Id.
243.
See id.
244.
Id. at 244.
245.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 244.
246.
Id. at 253.
247.
Id. at 249.
248.
Sharp v. Keeler (Sharp II), 288 S.W.3d 256 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
249.
Sharp v. Keeler (Sharp I), 256 S.W.3d 528 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007).
250.
Id. at 537-38 (including: not sharing medical information with the father when
the child was undergoing chemotherapy; giving the father false information about medical
procedures their son needed; refusing to let medical staff provide the father information
about the child’s medical condition; rushing the child to the emergency room and contemplating a stomach pump in response to the father giving the sick child half the recommended
dose of Tylenol; cursing the father in front of the child; and failing to cooperate with the
father’s visitation schedule).
251.
Id. at 538.
252.
Id. at 539.
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health, the court required a more definitive psychological evaluation to
deem her mentally unfit for unsupervised visitation.253
While the circumstances in Hicks and Sharp are notably different, the
court’s disparity in handling similar concerns about the mental fitness of the
mothers is striking. In Sharp, the court erred to leniency in the absence of a
definitive medical diagnosis even though the mother had committed prior
acts that were detrimental to the child,254 but in Hicks the court did not require medical expert testimony to support its inference that the mother’s
untreated past mental issues would negatively impact the child.255 Furthermore, there were no past acts in Hicks in which the mother’s mental health
or failure to take medication indicated that her ability to take care of the
child had been or ever would be compromised,256 unlike in Sharp where the
mother lost custody of her child for specific acts that negatively impacted
the child.257 Both dissents in Hicks noted how the trial court was “practicing
medicine without a license”258 and “without the benefit of expert testimony.”259
Judge Heffley’s dissent in Hicks also took specific issue with how the
trial court further incorrectly correlated the mother’s mental health with the
need for medication: “Far be it for someone to stop taking medication that
one does not need.”260 Judge Linker Hart’s dissent asserted that the evidence of the mother’s mental health was “at best, circumstantial,” and the
court did not and could not have taken judicial notice of such a reasonably
disputed fact.261 Therefore, the court projected two facts and treated them as
undisputed even though the father failed to sufficiently establish them—that
the mother had mental conditions that impaired her ability to raise her child,
and that the mother needed to continue taking medication.262
Such projection of speculated facts is inconsistent with the Arkansas
Supreme Court that has specifically held that where “no harm has been
shown to the children . . . a decision based on perceptions and appearances”
is not sufficient to overturn custody.263 Thus, it was improper for the Hicks
court to consider the mother’s perceived mental health barring substantive

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Sharp I, 288 S.W.3d 537-39.
Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
Id.
Sharp I, 288 S.W.3d at 537-38.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 253-54 (Hart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 255 (Heffley, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 253 (Hart, J., dissenting).
See id. at 253-55 (Hart, J. and Heffley, J., dissenting).
See Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 739 (Ark. 2003).
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evidence that her mental health was problematic to the child’s best interest.264
An inability to reconcile the Hicks’ mental health analysis emerges
once the lack of evidence the court still utilized is considered, especially
when combined with the precedent that courts will defer to presume mental
fitness barring an affirmative medical diagnosis to the contrary.265 Interestingly, neither the father nor the court in Hicks attested to any specific inability of the mother to continue properly caring for the well-being of the
child aside from the physical dirt and bites noted in the isolated instance
discussed, supra.266 The court’s stated reasons about physical and mental
concerns have been discredited, leaving the only remaining nondiscriminatory reason the court could have used—the best interest of the
child as measured by the home environment each parent could provide.267
The trial court in Hicks was reticent about why it specifically found
the father in a superior position to raise the child, stating generally, “the
father has met the requirements of assuming his responsibilities toward the
child by providing care, supervision, protection, and financial support.”268
While the father testified that he had access to family, parks, and a preschool, there was no evidence to indicate the mother did not have access to
family, parks, or a preschool, so these resources alone do not indicate a
superior environment for the child.269 Similarly, the court unilaterally referenced that the mother “is a nursing assistant, and that she wants to be a social worker” without detailing the father’s occupation or whether he has
financial means to raise the child.270
The appellate court provided no specific elucidation beyond these
statements and cited only the trial court’s concern with the child’s safety,
the mother’s mental health, and the mother’s “Wiccan religion” to affirm
the trial court’s decision.271 Therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint how the
father was better able to provide for the child, but the implication is that the
father somehow would provide better for the child.272 A concise analysis of
the governing law will demonstrate that the trial and appellate court erred in
putting any weight into the home environment based on such undeveloped
facts.273
264.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 249.
265.
Sharp v. Keeler (Sharp I), 256 S.W.3d 528, 537-39.
266.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 246.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269.
Id. at 245.
270.
Id. at 246.
271.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 246.
272.
Id. at 245-46.
273.
Id. at 245. A shadow of gender discrimination may appear here as well, because
the court in no ways shuns the father for having children with multiple women, including the
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Taylor v. Taylor reinforced that a custody change may not be justified
simply because one parent has more income or resources in general.274 The
Arkansas Supreme Court went so far as to say that “it was aware of no
cases where custody was changed merely because one parent had more
resources or income than the other.”275 The larger concern with the child’s
best interest is health and education.276
In Sykes v. Warren, the Arkansas Appellate Court overturned an initial
custody ruling in favor of the father of a child born out of wedlock.277 One
of the primary reasons the trial court awarded the father custody was because of his financial stability compared to the mother who received government aid.278 The appellate court justified the reversal on the reasoning
that financial status is only relevant to provide a stable environment, and
that the mother “lived within her means . . . and managed to run an independent household where she could be a full-time parent.”279 Both Taylor
and Sykes establish that financial resources cannot be dispositive of the best
interest of the child, barring an affirmative showing that one parent’s financial situation is insufficient to provide for the child’s well-being.280
Applying the precedent that custody must only be changed where one
parent’s environment provides for the well-being of the child where the
other parent’s environment is deficient, the Hicks court failed to recognize
the mother’s undisputed ability to provide for her child.281 The court may
have properly found that the father was able to provide for the best interests
of the child, but because the court failed to detail in any way that the mother
was not able to provide for the best interests of the child, the father’s financial and environmental factors the court alluded to could not have been the
reason the mother lost custody of her child.282
Now that the child’s physical condition, the mother’s mental health,
and the financial situation have been individually eliminated by binding
mother in this case. However, this court references a case that makes a point that a mother
having four children from different fathers supported its removal of one child’s custody in
favor of the father. See Sheppard v. Spier, 157 S.W.3d 583, 585 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004).
274.
Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ark. 2003).
275.
Id.
276.
Id., referring to 1 JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE § 4-18, at
4-44, 4-20, at 4-47 (2d ed. 2002) (“Financial resources of the parties are normally irrelevant
to a custody determination,” and “financial resources of the parents have been found to be
relevant to the extent that they reflect a parent's ability to provide a stable home,” specifically, “the ability of one parent to meet the educational or health needs of the child better
than the other parent.”).
277.
Sykes v. Warren, 258 S.W.3d 788 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007).
278.
Id. at 793.
279.
Id.
280.
Taylor, 110 S.W.3d at 736; Sykes, 258 S.W.3d at 793.
281.
See Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244, 245-46 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
282.
See id.
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precedent in other Arkansas custody decisions, the only remaining nondiscriminatory explanation for the court’s decision in Hicks is the aggregate
effect of the three factors.283 These factors, however, cannot be reasonably
compounded in Hicks to justify removal of the child from the mother’s custody, because the factors do not represent degrees of probative value that
can be stacked to prove underlying parental unfitness by the mother.284 Instead, each factor is a matter of relevant applicability that does not and
should not compound with the others.285
The unsubstantiated concern for the physical condition of the child in
the one alleged incident cannot be rationally correlated to the mother’s
mental health, nor can the mental health concern be correlated to the financial and environmental well-being of the child.286 If there were several instances of physical neglect instead of the one alleged,287 for example, each
instance could be compounded to establish a greater pattern of parental
unfitness. Or, if the father alleged with some evidence that the mother’s
mental condition caused her to neglect the physical well-being of the child,
those factors could possibly be aggregated.288 However, neither the father
nor either court argued that any of the factors correlated to another, so they
could only be properly considered in isolation and applied if found by a
preponderance of evidence.289 For the reasons already stated, each factor
was judicially insufficient to be proved in Hicks because the court violated
proper and precedential jurisprudence when it rationalized and upheld any
of those factors from the trial court’s decision.290
2.

Revealing the Discriminatory Application of Judicial Power

With every non-discriminatory reason for the Hicks decision discredited individually and collectively, the trial judge’s personal bias against
Wicca was the true reason the court stripped the mother of custody over her
only child.291 The appellate court’s majority opinion erred when it concluded that “there is no basis to hold that the trial court resolved this initial
custody determination on appellant’s interest or involvement with Wicca,
but simply pointed out appellant’s lack of credibility on the issue.”292 The
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 245-46.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 246.
See id.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 245, 249.
See id. at 248.
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trial court explicitly voiced its concern, not about the mother’s credibility,
but about Wicca: “One final concern is her testimony regarding the WICCA
religion, movement, cult or whatever that may be. She testified that . . . she
was involved, but was only joking. That is no joking matter. The Court believes she is much more involved than she would now lead us to believe.”293
First, note that the trial court capitalized Wicca to draw emphasis in a
way that immediately suggests the court’s non-acceptance of Wicca as a
valid religion.294 Justice Gladwin who wrote the Hicks lead opinion never
used all capital letters when referring to the “Christian” religion in his opinions, therefore, it is strange he would not have detected prejudice in the trial
court’s anomalous spelling choice of the “WICCA religion.”295
The trial court then referred to Wicca as a “cult,” which can only be
reasonably described as “pejorative” language, as the mother contended on
appeal.296 The trial court’s derogatory employment of the word “cult” is
further evidenced by the context of the case.297 The father argued at trial
that “not all religions are worthy of constitutional protection,” that “Wicca
is a cult, not a religious belief,” and asserting that the “court is committing a
grievous error if it allows cult activities to be protected.”298 How could the
judge have reasonably meant for the word “cult” in his opinion to mean
anything less than the denigration and/or disparagement of Wicca in light of
the “vile and slanderous” arguments made by the father?299
The reference to “no joking matter” further reveals that the court was
undoubtedly concerned about the mother’s beliefs in such an unconventional belief system, whether she validly practiced Wicca or not.300 Yet the
appellate majority found that “the trial judge did not impermissibly base his
decision on his perception of appellant’s religious preferences,”301 and a
concurring justice stated that “the trial judge made no disparaging or otherwise unfavorable comments about Wicca.”302
293.
Id. at 247.
294.
Id.
295.
Compare id., with Bullock v. Steed, No. CA 08-394, 2008 WL 4735961, at *4
(Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2008) (referring to a child’s beliefs that her mother “is not a Christian”), and Sykes v. Warren, 258 S.W.3d 788, 790 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (referring to a living
environment as a “Christian home”).
296.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 247.
297.
Id.
298.
Id. at 255 (Hart, J., dissenting opinion on the denial of rehearing) (quoting the
father’s inflammatory arguments which included that Mormons, as a whole, “practice incest
and child marriages”).
299.
Id. at 255.
300.
Id. at 247.
301.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 248.
302.
Id. at 249 (Griffen, J., concurring).
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The notion that these comments were simply made to impeach her
credibility is a gross misreading of non-clandestine language that is charged
with anti-Wiccan prejudice.303 Even assuming, arguendo, that the concern
was about the mother’s credibility, what possible relevance did the
mother’s religious beliefs have to do with her ability to look after the best
interest of her child—the central issue in the case?304 No evidence supports
that the mother’s credibility was ever at issue or that any of her other testimony was disputed by the father.305 By contrast, the mother was abundantly
cooperative with the proceedings and never contradicted the father’s general fitness as a parent, so it is unclear how her credibility became a material issue sufficient to eclipse noticeably prejudicial language.306
The dissenting justices correctly pointed out the glaring misapplication
of the majority and concurrence’s treatment of the trial court’s language,
poignantly surmising that “they [the majority] twist the words in the finding
regarding Hicks’s alleged practice of Wicca to be a finding regarding
Hicks’s credibility, notwithstanding the fact that this case does not turn on
the credibility of any witness!”307 “The trial court’s mention of Wicca cannot be dismissed as a simple credibility determination . . . . Obviously, the
judge held her interest in Wicca against her.”308 Knowing that the asserted
reasons for taking the child away from the mother were pretextual and not
enough to support a mixed-motive assertion, the erroneous decision’s effect
was that “[t]he child was removed from a home, which the record reflects
was otherwise appropriate in every way.”309
Further evidence of the court’s prejudice and misapplication of judicial
authority exists in the fact that religious beliefs are in no way relevant to the
child custody determination, other than to possibly accommodate the custodial parent’s desires for the child to participate in religious services while
the child is with the non-custodial parent.310 Why was the mother’s religion
at issue, if not for the father’s successful attempt to create a prejudicial effect?311 Even the majority held that “no party explored the connections between religious belief and [the child’s best interest].”312 There was no rele303.
See id. at 247.
304.
Id.
305.
See generally id.
306.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 248 (“[The father] proved he was a fit parent to raise
the child. [This was] not denied by appellant.”).
307.
Id. at 253 (Hart, J., dissenting).
308.
Id. at 254 (Heffley, J., dissenting).
309.
Id. at 255 (Heffley, J., dissenting).
310.
See, e.g., Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W.2d 728, 731-32 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (ordering the non-custodial father to “see that his children did [attend religious services] to maintain consistency in the religious regimen that their mother has set for them”).
311.
See generally Hicks, 288 S.W.3d 244.
312.
Id. at 248.
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vancy connecting religion to the child’s best interest, so why would the trial
court have incorporated provocative anti-Wiccan statements into the decision unless it improperly factored that evidence into the custody determination?313 And how could the appellate court have refused to recognize the
erroneous inclusion of a topic whose prejudicial effect is only outweighed
by its irrelevance?314
Another intriguing fact that strongly suggests improper use of religious
prejudice by the trial court is that the judge questioned the mother directly
about her religious beliefs once the father had initiated questions about the
mother’s Wiccan beliefs.315 A dissenting justice described it as “the trial
judge interjected himself into the proceedings and began interrogating the
appellant about [Wicca].”316
If the inflammatory comments and arguments made by the father regarding Wicca were the only evidence of inappropriate use of religion in
the trial, a stronger case could be made that the judge did not improperly
factor the mother’s religion into his decision.317 The judge, however, not
only tolerated the line of irrelevant religious questioning, but he pursued it
on his own.318 The judge’s direct involvement in the questioning about
Wicca, combined with the vituperative comments made about the Wiccan
“cult,”319 demonstrate that the “trial court’s mention of Wicca cannot be
dismissed as a simple credibility determination,”320 but that the overwhelming indication is that the judge actively used impermissible prejudice
against Wicca to influence the custody determination.
Significantly, an appellate court has good reason to give “special deference to the trial judge’s ability to evaluate and judge the credibility of the
witnesses,”321 and not overturn a decision barring evidence of clear error.322
However, the majority’s affirmation of the Hicks’ determination revealed,
at a minimum, impermissible complicity with a clearly erroneous trial court

313.
Id.
314.
Id. at 247-49.
315.
Id. at 253 (Hart, J., dissenting).
316.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 255 (Hart, J., dissenting).
317.
Id.
318.
Id. at 253 (Hart, J., dissenting).
319.
Id. at 247.
320.
Id. at 254 (Heffley, J., dissenting).
321.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 245; Hamilton v. Barrett, 989 S.W.2d 520 (Ark. Ct. App.
1999).
322.
Harris v. Grice, 244 S.W.3d 9, 11 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that clear error
is reviewed de novo and, “[a] finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made”) (citing Dunham v. Doyle, 129 S.W.3d 304
(Ark. Ct. App. 2003)).
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proceeding.323 If the trial judge’s tolerance, interrogation, and inclusion of
charged facts regarding the mother’s religious practices—irrelevant and
immaterial to a custody determination—throughout the trial and opinion do
not constitute clear error, then it “betray[s] the belief by the majority that
this deference is somehow the way to resolve every case.”324 The precedent
suggested by this opinion is that anything short of the trial court stating to
cease and desist any exposure of the child to Neo-Paganism, as in Jones,325
is not clear error.326
However, the Arkansas Appellate Court is not always reticent to find
clear error in custody cases that do not involve Neo-Pagan parents,327 suggesting that the prejudice in Hicks is more a product of systemic prejudice
than of universal deference.328 The Arkansas Appellate Court in Harris v.
Grice, including two of the same justices in the majority holding in
Hicks,329 found clear error in the trial judge’s moralistic comments about
custody battles.330 The judge commented that “‘custody fights were just as
bad for the children’ and that he wanted ‘to discourage these custody
cases.’”331 The appellate court reasoned that the trial judge’s disdain for
custody battles resulted in an improper upholding of the current custody
determination.332 So the appellate court was quick to infer an ulterior motive on the judge, based on a few isolated comments in Harris,333 whereas
the appellate court in Hicks had to, “twist the words in the [trial judge’s]
finding” to construe them to be valid and non-discriminatory.334
Perhaps the most revealing contradiction is that the Hicks majority
went through contortions to uphold the trial court’s decision while denying
religion was at play, but the Arkansas Appellate Court, including the justice
that wrote the Hicks lead opinion as well as an agreeing justice,335 later referenced Hicks as standing for the proposition that “in child custody disputes
. . . a parent’s religiously motivated choices and actions are material if they

323.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 245, 249.
324.
Id. at 253 (Hart, J., dissenting).
325.
Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
326.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 248-49.
327.
See, e.g., Harris, 244 S.W.3d at 13-14.
328.
See Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 249.
329.
Id. at 49 (agreeing Justice Glover and concurring Justice Griffen); Harris, 244
S.W.3d at 14 (agreeing Justice Glove and Justice Griffen).
330.
Harris v. Grice, 244 S.W.3d 9, 13-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).
331.
Id. at 13.
332.
Id.
333.
Id.
334.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 253 (Hart, J., dissenting).
335.
Id. at 245 (leading opinion of Justice Gladwin, agreeing opinion of Justice
Glover).
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affect a child’s well-being.”336 If the Hicks decision truly did not “turn[] on
the trial court’s acceptance or rejection of a specific religion,” and religion
was only used to “judge the credibility of the witness[],” then how can
Hicks later mean that a parent’s religious beliefs are material to a custody
determination?337 The court contradicted itself and exposed that the appellate court in Hicks knowingly allowed and perpetuated the blatant misuse of
religious prejudice to strip a mother of the custody of her two year old
child.338
C.

THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE OF COURTS TO NOT DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST NEO-PAGAN PARENTS

In fairness to the Hicks court, no other appellate case in Arkansas, before or after, ever implicated Neo-Paganism in a parental custody case.339
The traditional American reaction is disdain for anything hinting at witchcraft, and even the learned judiciary is not always immune to this deepseeded prejudice.340 The shroud of misunderstanding is not exclusive to
Arkansas, but is endemic to most states that have no more than a handful of
appellate level cases that implicate Neo-Paganism in any way, much less
cases that directly involve parental custody.341
Other state courts that have dealt with Neo-Paganism in the context of
parental custody have commonly invoked similar prejudices to the Jones
and Hicks courts. The Tennessee appellate case of In re R.D.H. involves a
mother’s petition to regain custody of her child after she and the father had
voluntarily given custody to the child’s grandparent.342 In recounting the
mother’s hardships at the time she relinquished custody, the court makes
the incorrect conflation that the parents “were involved with ‘wiccan’ or
Satanism practices.”343 While the mother was granted custody, the court
still took note of the fact that the mother’s involvement with Wicca was in
the past and made sure to list it as one of the many disturbing activities that
had gone on in the mother’s life, along with drug abuse and domestic vio-

336.
Thorne v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Serv., 2010 Ark. App. 443, 17 (Ct. App.
May 19, 2010), http://opinions.aoc.arkansas.gov/WebLink8/ElectronicFile.aspx?docid=
45241&dbid=0.
337.
Hicks, 288 S.W.3d at 248.
338.
See id.
339.
See generally id.
340.
See supra Part II.C.
341.
See, e.g., In re R.D.H., No. M2006-00837-COA-R3-JV, 2007 WL 2403352
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007).
342.
Id. at *1.
343.
Id.
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lence.344 Might the outcome of the custody determination have been different if evidence was presented that the mother was still practicing Wicca?345
The California appellate case In re Marriage of Deuel echoed the
Jones court’s346 restrictions on a parent’s right to expose a child to various
topics, including “abortion, Wicca, [and] abuse between [the parents].”347
The Deuel court upheld the restraint on these topics and treated Wicca as
something nefarious and less than a valid religious belief.348 Deuel is no
longer good law, but it serves as another recent example of judicial prejudice against Neo-Paganism.349
The Minnesota appellate case of Froberg v. Froberg did not invoke
outward prejudices against Neo-Paganism, but the father sought sole custody partly on the basis that the mother was involving, “at least one of the
children in the Wicca religion.”350 What is compelling is that the parents
initially had joint legal custody of the children, which means both were
equally able to control the religious upbringing of the children.351 The father was Catholic; the mother became Wiccan after the divorce.352 Yet the
court admonished the mother for failing “to support the children’s Catholic
upbringing,” as if she had no right whatsoever to expose the children to her
own religious beliefs.353
The mother undeniably acted in many ways for the trial court to have
reasonably granted custody to the father, but the court still employed language that disparately treated Wicca from the more accepted Catholic faith
of the father.354 For example, “[a]ppellant claims to be a member of the
Wicca religion whereas respondent is Catholic.”355 Why does the court have
to qualify a “claim[] to be” Wiccan, whereas the father is just simply Catholic?356 The decision itself does not suggest anything erroneous, but the opinion cannot hold the mother’s Wiccan beliefs at the same level it holds the
344.
Id.
345.
See generally R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352.
346.
Jones v. Jones, 832 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
347.
In re Marriage of Deuel, No. F050088, 2007 WL 2318744, at *34 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2007).
348.
Id.
349.
Id.
350.
Froberg v. Froberg, No. A04-2511, 2006 WL 330086, at *8-9 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 2006) (elaborating further, the court’s specific concern was that the mother had to
notify the father of any changes in the children’s religious exposure, which she did not do).
351.
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2002).
352.
Froberg, 2006 WL 330086, at *8.
353.
Id.
354.
Id. at *6-8 (finding that the mother had neglected one child’s diabetes to the
point that it caused possible kidney damage and also attempted to get a restraining order
against the father so he could not visit the children).
355.
Id. at *8 (emphases added).
356.
Froberg, 2006 WL 330086.
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father’s Catholic beliefs, hinting at a prejudice that may be so deep-seeded
that it is subconscious.357
In the wake of this litany of recent custody decisions that unfavorably
treat Neo-Paganism, it is important to note that there are examples of courts
objectively handling custody decisions predicated in part on a parent’s NeoPagan beliefs.358 The majority of court opinions in custody decisions, however, mistreat Neo-Paganism as an invalid belief or as a lesser quasireligion.359 For the reasons previously stated,360 any treatment of NeoPaganism as less than a valid religion is constitutionally impermissible, yet
many courts continue to perpetuate the societal prejudice against NeoPaganism.361
V.

TITLE VII’S OVER-ALLOWANCE FOR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BY
RELIGIOUS ENTITIES AND ITS IMPACT ON NEO-PAGANS

Another way Neo-Pagans face legal discrimination is ironically
through an act of Congress that seemingly aimed to protect religious practitioners from discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains religious entity exemptions that are, unfortunately, an overbroad loophole in what is an otherwise well-crafted and high-quality body of legislation.362 This section will explore the background of the legislation, specifically as it pertains to religious discrimination, and demonstrate how a more
narrowly tailored approach to accommodate religious entities would
achieve the necessary safeguards to protect religious organizations, while
minimizing the unwanted religious discrimination that Title VII aimed to
eliminate.363 A strong argument can be made that because the exemptions
are not the least restrictive means to further a compelling government inter-

357.
Id.
358.
E.g., Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711, 717-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (rejecting the petitioning mother’s claim that the custodial father’s Neo-Pagan beliefs were
harmful to the children); V.F.O. v. J.J.O, No. CS92-3627, 2001 WL 1773676, at *8 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Feb. 14, 2001) (holding that the joint custodial mother’s right to expose the children to Wiccan beliefs must be honored along with the father’s right to expose the children
to Methodist beliefs).
359.
E.g., Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008); Froberg, 2006 WL
330086.
360.
See supra Part III.
361.
E.g., Hicks, 288 S.W.3d 244; Froberg, 2006 WL 330086.
362.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252. (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1-2000e-3).
363.
Id.
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est,364 they are constitutionally invalid as an undue burden on the free exercise of religion.365
A.

THE BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII’S RELIGIOUS ENTITY EXEMPTIONS

Title VII’s inclusion of religion as a protected status of public and private employment stands out from the other protected characteristics: race,
color, sex, national origin, and age, because religious beliefs are based on
choice and not immutable characteristics.366 The reason to protect religion
“is clearly consistent with the basic concept of religious freedom that is
embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution.”367 Tolerance for
religious beliefs is implicit in the freedom to exercise religion and is necessary for individuals to seek and maintain employment.368 The failure to
protect religion in employment may result in the exclusion of certain religious practitioners from large sectors of private employment and undermine
the entire notion of religious freedom.369 If such exclusion were permitted,
taken to the extreme, a religious majority in America could relegate minority religious practitioners to the point of economic distress and the most
menial forms of employment.370
Yet the protection of religion in employment, like almost all rights, is
not absolute or limitless because there is a competing interest, stemming
from the Establishment Clause, which must protect religious organizations
from undue interference by the government to dictate the manner in which a
religious organization pursues its objectives.371 For example, it would be
unreasonable for a Presbyterian church to keep a minister employed who
recently converted to Hinduism, just as it would be unreasonable for a
Hindu temple to keep a pandit employed who recently converted to Presbyterian Christianity.372 Such restrictions would frustrate the organization’s
purpose to perform work in the advancement of its religion.373
364.
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006).
365.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
366.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 200e-1-2000e-3).
367.
DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 629 (8th ed. 2010).
368.
See id. at 629-32.
369.
Id.
370.
See id.
371.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
372.
See Duane E. Okamoto, Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption
for Religious Organizations: A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1381-82 (1987).
373.
Id.
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To prevent unreasonable hardships on religious organizations, Congress included two exemptions for religious entities in Title VII. The pertinent exemption for this analysis states that Title VII “shall not apply to . . .
a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society.”374
The other exemption pertains specifically to religious educational institutions.375 Significantly, the first exemption originally applied “to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on . . . of its religious activities.”376 The 1972 amendment
revised the end of the statement to apply to “its activities” and removed
“religious.”377
The legislative intent behind the amendment may be partially gleaned
from its Senate sponsors, one of whom stated: “Our amendment would
strike out the word ‘religious’ and remove religious institutions in all respects from the subjugation to the EEOC [(Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission)],”378 and “take the political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they have no place to be.”379 The other Senate sponsor
was concerned that without the amendment, “there would be nothing to
prevent an atheist being forced upon a religious school to teach some subject other than theology.”380 The shared concern of the co-sponsors was
specifically to not require a religious entity to hire outside of its religious
beliefs, because it could interfere with the advancement of the entity’s religious objectives.381 Unfortunately, however, the legislative history is not
clear as to whether the amendment was passed to broadly exempt religious
institutions from all possible liability for religious discrimination.382

374.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1972)).
375.
§ 703(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
376.
§ 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
377.
§ 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1972).
378.
King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (paraphrasing
Sen. Allen’s comments).
379.
The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972: Hearing on Amend. 809 to S. 2515, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
380.
King’s Garden, 498 F.2d at 55 (paraphrasing Sen. Allen’s comments).
381.
See The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 Hearing on Amend. 809 to S. 2515,
92nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1972).
382.
See Okamoto, supra note 372, at 1384-87.
[The] changes in the exemption coupled with the sponsors’ intent via the
legislative history left the extent or breadth of the amendment's exemption unclear and subject to two possible interpretations—one favoring
religious group autonomy rights and the other limiting such rights in favor of the individual employee.
Id. at 1384.
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The original language intentionally narrowed the exemption to employees directly performing religious activities,383 but the Supreme Court
interpreted the amendment as creating the broadest possible loophole that
now allows religious entities to patently discriminate against any employee
performing any job function at any time before or during employment.384 In
theory a thirty-year employee who has served satisfactorily as a religious
community center’s groundskeeper could be fired just because he observes
a particular religion or none at all, even if the employee never introduced
his religious beliefs in the workplace.385 Furthermore, the exemption may
not be waived generally, even if the employer boasts being an equal opportunity employer and derives benefit from holding itself out as such.386
Granting such unfettered discretion to religious entities upheaves the
necessary and delicate balance between the free exercise of religion and
permissible protection of religious entities’ objectives.387 As will be demonstrated, what was enacted to be a shield to protect religious entities from
undue governmental interference388 has oftentimes been employed as a
sword to castigate certain religious practitioners in an appalling way that
frustrates Title VII’s purpose.389 Not surprisingly, the victims of the overinclusive religious entity exemption are oftentimes religious minorities.390
While the theme of this analysis continues to be the disparate impact on
Neo-Pagans, the discrimination through the exemption may be based on
any religious difference, even slight and sometimes regarding issues invoking other forms of discrimination.391
The Supreme Court fielded an Establishment Clause challenge to the
religious entity exemptions in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.

383.
§ 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1970).
384.
See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329-31 (1987).
385.
See Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (upholding the firing of a janitor who was not qualified
for membership in the Mormon church of his employer).
386.
Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991)). But see, e.g., Siegel v. TruettMcConnell College, Inc., 73 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging waiver may exist,
but only if the entity states that it will not discriminate on religious grounds).
387.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
388.
The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 Hearing on Amend. 809 to S. 2515, 92nd
Cong. 1st Sess. (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
389.
See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D.
Iowa 2006).
390.
E.g., id.
391.
E.g., Hall, 215 F.3d at 624-27 (upholding the exemption for defendant terminating employee who was a lesbian, because her orientation was against the Baptist Christian
beliefs of her employer, even though employee was non-denominational Christian).

2011]

OPENING THE BROOM CLOSET

183

Amos.392 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that religious institutions should
not be permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion for non-religious
positions, because religious institutions are being favored or promoted by
the government.393
The Court rejected this argument, holding that “[t]here is ample room
under the Establishment Clause for ‘benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.’”394 The Court recognized that religious exemptions could constitute
over-interference by the government, but that the religious entity exemption
was neutral and benign.395 The Court in Amos also rejected an Equal Protection argument under low level scrutiny, finding the exemption’s small accommodation to religious entities to be “rationally related to the legitimate
purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability
of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”396
Two arguments can be made to trigger a heightened level of scrutiny
to invalidate the religious entity exemption that the Court has not addressed.
First, an alternative Establishment Clause claim could be made that specifically challenges the intent and impact of the religious entity exemption as
overly promoting a particular religion, Christianity.397 Second, that under
the Free Exercise Clause, the religious entity exemptions are overbroad and
fail to comply with the heightened scrutiny required under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).398
B.

THE RELIGIOUS ENTITY EXEMPTION V. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
ROUND 2

In light of the Amos decision that rejected the general Establishment
Clause challenge to the religious entity exemption on the basis that the exemption is benevolent and neutral,399 statistics suggest that the exemption is
392.
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (applying the three prong Lemon Test to determine if legislation
violates Establishment Clause). The Lemon Test requires a law’s primary effect to not promote or deter religion, and it must not create an entanglement of government and religion. A
law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows the advancement of religion. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
393.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 327.
394.
Id. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
395.
Id. at 334-35.
396.
Id. at 339.
397.
Id. at 334-35 (acknowledging that a religious exemption could violate the Establishment Clause).
398.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1489 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006)).
399.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35.
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far from neutral.400 It is true that a minority religious entity could use the
religious entity exemption to just as easily discriminate against a religious
practitioner in the majority.401 However, the overwhelming majority of religious organizations in the United States are Christian-based, therefore, the
natural consequence is that even if all religious entities discriminated by the
same percentage, the disparate impact would be exceedingly felt by religious minorities.402
All seventy-four of the listed religious organizations with 1000 or
more employees are Christian-based, and 129 out of 130 of religious organizations with 500 or more employees are Christian-based.403 Also consider
that over 600 of the 628 religious organizations that generate $2.5 million
or more in revenue annually are Christian-based, a list that includes numerous large hospital groups, national retailers, auto dealerships, and even a
National Football League franchise.404 Religious entities are not confined to
traditional images of churches and ministry outreach services, but have
tendrils reaching into industries that most people consider secular.405 In
many markets a religious organization may be the area’s largest employer.406 Any notion that the diversity in major religious employers mirrors
the nation’s religious diversity is erroneous based on the following statistical breakdown of religious beliefs in the United States:
Religious Beliefs Held by
Americans

ARIS 1990
Survey407

ARIS 2008
Survey408

Christian

86.2%

76.0%

Agnostic/Atheistic

8.2%

15.0%

All Others

5.6%

9.0%

The Court in Amos specifically left open the door for a constitutional
challenge to the impact of the religious entity exemption when it stated, “At
400.
Religious
Organizations
of
the
United
States,
MANTA.COM,
http://www.manta.com/mb_34_F0295_000/religious_organizations (last visited Dec. 16,
2010).
401.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006).
402.
Religious Organizations of the United States, supra note 400.
403.
Id.
404.
Religious
Organizations
in
the
United
States,
MANTA,
http://www.manta.com/mb_34_F0295_000/religious_organizations (last visited Dec. 16,
2010) (including Tennessee Titans Baptist Sports).
405.
Id.
406.
See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D.
Iowa 2006). The defendant boasts being the largest employer in the area. MERCY MEDICAL
CENTER, http://www.mercyclinton.com/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
407.
American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note 124.
408.
American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008), supra note 131.
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some point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of
religion.’”409 With no suggestion that any scheme or intent existed to promote a particular religion by the exemption, the reality—more than two
decades removed from Amos—is that large religious employers are overwhelmingly represented by one particular religion, disproportionate to the
population.410 The practical effect of the exemption is that it allows almost
all of the largest religious organizations to minimally exclude 24% of the
population from employment carte blanche.411
Disregarding the obvious Equal Protection claim that previously failed
in Amos,412 could the Supreme Court find “an unlawful fostering of religion”413 when viewing the exemption in light of the enormous statistical disparity favoring one religion?414 And if not, what statistical disparity between religious employers and the representative population would constitute a fostering of religion?
C.

THE RELIGIOUS ENTITY EXEMPTION V. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

The Supreme Court limited the scope and application of strict scrutiny
to a series of Free Exercise cases subsequent to Sherbert v. Verner.415 Congress responded by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) to restore a semblance of the prior Sherbert test’s heightened scrutiny, requiring the government to use the least restrictive means to further a
compelling government interest when religious rights are infringed.416 The
Court, however, invalidated the RFRA finding that Congress overreached
its granted authority as applied to the states.417 Yet the Court held that the
409.
See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 145 (1987)).
410.
Religious
Organizations
of
the
United
States,
MANTA.COM,
http://www.manta.com/mb_34_F0295_000/religious_organizations (last visited Dec. 16,
2010).
411.
Id.
412.
See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
413.
See id. at 335.
414.
See id.
415.
Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-10 (1963) (establishing the
Sherbert Test, most pertinently holding: “whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies
substantial infringement” of an individual’s freedom to exercise religious beliefs, whether
direct or indirect), with e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(disregarding strict scrutiny analysis because government actions were neutral and not intended to have detrimental impact religious practices).
416.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1489 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006)).
417.
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress overreached its
power under the Fourteenth Amendment by applying the RFRA to the states); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
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RFRA is applicable to the Federal Government, thus the RFRA is valid for
claims based on federal law, presumably including Title VII challenges.418
Because Amos preceded the RFRA, the plaintiff did not assert a Free
Exercise claim.419 Subsequently, the Court never addressed whether the
religious entity exemption violated the least restrictive means under the
RFRA standard of review to the Free Exercise Clause.420 The basic argument, however, is that while the religious entity exemption serves a compelling state interest, the statute is overbroad because there are ample alternatives that would minimize unnecessary religious discrimination.421 Therefore, the exemption is invalid unless it is narrowed in application.422
1.

Discriminatory Application of the Religious Entity Exemption to NeoPagans

Dodge v. Salvation Army was the seminal case addressing a large religious organization using the religious entity exemption to terminate a victims’ assistance coordinator due to her Neo-Pagan beliefs.423 In Dodge, the
plaintiff was terminated after she used the office copy machine to reproduce
pages with Wiccan rituals on them, and she filed suit for religious discrimination.424 The plaintiff had subsequently renounced her Wiccan faith and
re-converted to Christianity,425 but the court upheld her motion for summary judgment because her position with the Salvation Army was substantially funded by the federal and state government.426 Due to the government
funding the court found “excessive government entanglement” under the
Establishment Clause to allow the defendant to discriminate on the basis of
religion.427 Yet the court acknowledged that the religious entity exemption
would otherwise be fully applicable to a similar situation in which the employer was not substantially funded by the government.428
418.
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficento Uniano do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006).
419.
See generally Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987).
420.
Id. (holding that the religious entity exemption did not constitute the government promoting any religion under an Establishment Clause challenge).
421.
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
422.
Id.
423.
Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. 588-0351, 1989 WL 53857, at *1 (S.D. Miss.
Jan. 9, 1989).
424.
Id. The court also found that the unauthorized use of office equipment could not
have been sufficient grounds for termination by itself. Id.
425.
Id. at *4.
426.
Id.
427.
Id.
428.
Dodge, 1989 WL 53857, at *2-3.
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In addition to the court’s mistaken acceptance that Wicca and Satanism are interchangeable terms and beliefs,429 what is interesting about the
Dodge opinion is that it exemplifies how courts have not recognized a distinction point between a religious organization promoting its own religion
versus a religious organization selectively discriminating against certain
other religions.430 If the true purpose of the religious entity exemption was
to allow religious organizations enough latitude to pursue their religious
objectives,431 why is it tolerable for religious entities to discriminate against
some but not all differing beliefs?432
To illustrate this thought further, imagine a Christian-based hospital
that has 70% Christian employees, 15% agnostic or atheistic employees,
5% Jewish employees, 3% Hindu employees, 3% Buddhist employees, 2%
Islamic employees, and 2% Neo-Pagan employees. Under the current application of the exemption, the hospital could fire the Jewish employees for
purely religious differences, even though the same religious difference exists with the Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and Neo-Pagan employees.433 Or the
employer could fire the atheist, Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and Neo-Pagan
employees but not the agnostic employees.434 As it frequently happens,
however, it is the Neo-Pagan employee who is singled out in these situations.435
An example of this selective discrimination is found in the case Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Services.436 Mercy is a Catholic-based religious
hospital in Clinton, Iowa, that has “nearly 1,000 employees” and boasts
being “the areas [sic] largest employer.”437 The plaintiff was a medical telemetry technologist whose job performance was never asserted to be less
than satisfactory. 438 She was never asked to perform non-secular job duties,
nor was she ever told during her employment that her job was contingent
upon her religious beliefs.439 When she was fired, she filed a religious discrimination claim under Title VII440 and the corresponding Iowa statute,441
429.
Id. at *4 (referring to “the proliferation of Satanic/Wiccan” material).
430.
See id. at *2-3.
431.
See The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972: Hearing on Amend. 809 to S. 2515,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
432.
E.g., Dodge, 1989 WL 53857, at *2-3.
433.
Id.
434.
Id.
435.
E.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Iowa
2006).
436.
Id.
437.
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, http://www.mercyclinton.com/about-us (last visited
Dec. 16, 2010).
438.
Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
439.
See id. at 1037-39.
440.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq. (1964).
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alleging that she was terminated “because of her Wiccan religious beliefs . .
. including reading Wiccan literature at work.”442 No facts were asserted
that the plaintiff proselytized in the workplace, exposed her reading material to patients, broadcast her religious beliefs to coworkers, or in any way
offended anyone based on her religion.443
The defendant never denied the religious claim and simply asserted the
religious entity exemption.444 The plaintiff argued that the hospital was
primarily secular, thus negating the exemption, and alternately, that it
waived its exemption by holding itself out as an equal opportunity employer with its policy stating that “Mercy is further committed to going
beyond the legal requirements of equal employment opportunity to take
action to achieve diversity in our working environment.”445 The appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment
in favor of the hospital after concluding that “there is no genuine issue of
material fact that Mercy is a ‘religious organization’ entitled to assert the
‘religious organization’ exemption to Title VII.”446
The appellate court also accepted an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the potential waiver claim based on its dicta regarding the possibility
of a waiver exception when a religious organization takes an explicit “undertaking not to discriminate against its personnel on the basis of religion.”447 Established case law does generally state that a religious entity cannot waive its exemption.448 Mercy’s policy, however, stated that it would
“not discriminate for any reason prohibited by law,” which the court correctly held to not be a waiver, because a religious entity’s practice of religious discrimination is not prohibited by law.449 The policy further stated
that it would go “beyond the legal requirements of equal employment . . . to
achieve diversity in [its] working environment.”450 The only area of discriminatory protection under Title VII,451 the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990,452 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967453

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
2000).
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2006).
Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
See generally Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1029-31.
Id. at 1043.
Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39.
E.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir.
Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39.
Id. at 1029.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq. (1964).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12118 (1990).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967).
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not available to Mercy’s employees was religious discrimination.454 Therefore, the areas of race, color, sex, national origin, age, and disability discrimination still applied in full force to the defendant.455 So what equal employment diversity could Mercy have possibly meant beyond “legal requirements” if not religion?456
Sexual orientation would be the only other commonly recognized area
of discrimination, other than religion, that was not already protected. Yet,
Mercy is based on Catholicism, a Christian denomination that holds nonheterosexuality to be a sin.457 Therefore, it is unlikely that a significant portion of potential employees would be non-heterosexual Catholics. So if
Mercy truly never intended to waive its religious discrimination exemption,
the additional language in the policy would have little applicable meaning if
the intention was to only further protect homosexual, bisexual, and transgendered Catholics because any other non-heterosexuals could still be fired
because of their religion.458
The court correctly referenced that waiver of the religious entity exemption would require an express “undertaking” by the religious employer
to not discriminate based on religion.459 However, does an employer not
conduct such an undertaking when it holds itself out as an equal opportunity
employer “beyond the legal requirements” and fails to disclose that it still
intends to discriminate against certain but not all religious beliefs?460
Another interesting wrinkle in the Saeemodarae decision is that the
plaintiff also alleged a Title VII retaliatory claim against the hospital which
the court rejected because the statutory language of the religious entity exemption “necessarily includes an exemption from the anti-retaliation provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).”461 Applying the exemption to retaliatory
claims is particularly problematic, because the court must apply a complex
examination to determine if a defendant qualifies as a religious entity.462
454.
See generally Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021.
455.
Id.
456.
Id. at 1038-39.
457.
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 272 (Robert C. Broderick ed. 1987) (“Homosexuality: Sexual activity between persons of the same sex. It is not a normal condition, the acts
being against nature are objectively wrong.”).
458.
E.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th Cir.
2000) (upholding firing of lesbian employee, because of conflict with employer’s religious
beliefs).
459.
Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (referencing Siegel v. Truett-McConnell
College, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1994)).
460.
Id. at 1029.
461.
Id. at 1041.
462.
Id. at 1025 (requiring “the court ‘to look at all the facts to decide if the [defendant] is a religious corporation,’ and in making this inquiry, ‘[i]t is appropriate to consider
and weigh the religious and secular characteristics of the institution’”) (citing Hall, 215 F.3d
at 624).
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This leaves a plaintiff like Ms. Saeemodarae in an intolerably precarious
position. Assuming that she is being discriminated against (notably the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did find probable cause of
religious discrimination), by pursuing a Title VII claim which requires administrative exhaustion, the defendant can then legally terminate the employee because she made the discrimination claim if the court finds the defendant is a religious organization.463 The alternatives are to do nothing and
endure what may be religious hostility or to voluntarily leave the employment.464
The Saeemodorae case epitomizes many of the problems with the
overbreadth of the religious entity exemption.465 Why should a good employee whose job function has nothing to do with religion be terminated
because she innocuously read a religious book during her break?466 Why is
it permissible for an employee to be terminated because of her beliefs when
she was never informed that her religion was a condition of employment?467
Why is it alright, assuming the organization does have a Christian purpose,
to terminate a Neo-Pagan employee while not terminating the other employees with various religious beliefs?468 What legal recourse does an employee who is subjected to religious discrimination by a quasi-religious
organization have if the retaliatory provisions of Title VII may not be available to her? Reiterating the fact that this hospital was the largest employer
in the area, what equivalent career options does a skilled medical professional have without relocating or commuting a great distance? The quandaries raised by Saeemodarae demonstrate how the religious entity exemption
is not narrowly tailored.
The Saeemodarae opinion even acknowledged the seemingly harsh
paradox that the religious entity exemption created, as the court proverbially washed its hands in deference to the overly broad statutory language
and application.469 The court sagaciously stated, “Just because Congress has
broadly enabled religious organizations to discriminate against employees
on the basis of their religion does not mean that they must or should do so .
. . . Was it fear of a perceived odd or strange religion like the Wicca[n] religion?”470 This admonition in dicta underscores how the religious entity
463.
Id. at 1032.
464.
See Okamoto, supra note 372, at 1387.
465.
Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021.
466.
Id.
467.
Id.
468.
See Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1030-31.
469.
Id. at 1043-44.
470.
Id. at 1044 (elaborating further, “this opinion does not address whether Mercy’s
actions were fair, just, or moral . . . . Was it religious intolerance or bigotry? Was the discharge ‘a Christian thing to do’?”).
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exemption is a potently offensive weapon that legitimizes discrimination
against an otherwise protected minority, and how its use by the court goes
well beyond the scope of religious requirement.471
2.

Less Restrictive Alternatives to the Religious Entity Exemption

One simple alternative to the overbreadth problem of the religious entity exemption is to discard the exemptions entirely, leaving religious institutions to assert a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense
under Title VII to any religious discrimination claims that arise.472 A BFOQ
is an affirmative defense that, if proven successfully, enables an employer
to avoid Title VII liability.473 The underlying logic to the BFOQ solution is
that the religious entity exemption is theoretically duplicative, because if
the exemption is used by organizations to further their religious purpose
then that objective would be “reasonably necessary” to qualify as a
BFOQ.474
There is a critical difference in application, however, between the
BFOQ and the religious entity exemption.475 The exemption bars the cause
of action, whereas a BFOQ is an affirmative defense generally requiring
additional judicial advancement; therefore, the religious entity exemption
provides judicial efficiency that a BFOQ cannot provide.476
Another solution to the overbreadth of the religious entity exemption
is direct, effective, and preserves the exemption’s efficiency. A legal presumption could be created that if an employee is not informed when hired
that their employment is conditioned on their religious beliefs, then the religious entity has waived its right to assert the exemption. This solution
would protect the reasonable expectations of employees performing secular
work for religious entities477 while still allowing a safety valve for religious
entities to overcome the presumption in situations involving convincingly
non-secular positions.478 Of course, the entity could prevent any problems
by simply disclosing the religious requirement at the time of hiring. Ultimately, religious organizations would not lose their exemption; they would
471.
See id. at 1043-44.
472.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1975) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful . . . for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is . . . reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”).
473.
Id.
474.
Id.
475.
Id.
476.
Id.
477.
See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Serv., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1030-31
(N.D. Iowa 2006).
478.
See Okamoto, supra note 372, at 1380-81.
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just have legal incentive to communicate their intention to utilize the exemption.
Such a solution may have some detrimental impact on larger religious
employers who engage a primarily secular workforce, such as Mercy, because qualified individuals in the pool of potential employees may resent a
religious requirement looming over their employment.479 It is more unreasonable, however, for companies like Mercy to advertise that they are equal
opportunity employers when they can still patently discriminate on the basis
of religion, than it is for an adequately performing employee to get blindsided by a largely unknown exemption within a widely known body of legislation that prohibits such discrimination.480 Under this alternative, the
religious organization would ultimately control whether to disclose the requirement to some or all of its employees, so any hardship that results from
its decision would be self-inflicted.
The existence of a less discriminatory alternative solution minimally
indicates that the religious entity exemption is invalid under the RFRA
standard that requires the least restrictive means be used.481
VI. THE CAULDRON IN THE COURTROOM: EVIDENTIARY DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST NEO-PAGANS
Impeaching witnesses’ credibility because of their religious beliefs is
seemingly barred by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which simply state:
“Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is
not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the
witness’[s] credibility is impaired or enhanced.”482 Despite the plain language of Federal Rule of Evidence 610 that is echoed by most states’ evidentiary rules,483 the introduction of Neo-Pagan beliefs has been impermissibly tolerated by many courts to impair a witness’s credibility.484
The rationale to exclude religious beliefs is to ensure that fact-finders
do not apply a prejudice in favor of a believer of their religion, and perhaps
more importantly, that fact-finders do not apply a prejudice against a believer of a different religion, because “disclosure of unconventional beliefs
has the greatest potential to incite the prejudice [Rule] 610 exists to pre479.
See, e.g., Saeemodarae, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1040-41.
480.
See id.
481.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
(1993).
482.
FED. R. EVID. 610.
483.
Id.; e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 610; LSA. C. EVID. 610; ILL. EVID. MAN. § 18:11; N.J.
R. EVID. 610.
484.
See, e.g., State v. Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890 (Kan. 2001); State v. Theer, 639 S.E.2d
655 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
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vent.”485 Underlying this principle is the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause, because the use of legal mechanisms to attack a witness on the basis
of her religion is a form of religious persecution that is constitutionally prohibited.486
One way courts may run afoul of this constitutional protection is by erroneously excluding Neo-Paganism from the definition of religion:
“[I]mposition by a judge of a narrow personal notion of religion may, in
and of itself, violate the notions of religious liberty inherent in both [Rule]
610 and the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”487 As previously stated, Neo-Paganism comports with the Supreme Court’s definition
of religion and must be accepted as such at all judicial levels for all judicial
purposes.488 Yet another problem is that some states, such as Kansas, do not
have a corollary rule of evidence to expressly prohibit religious questioning
for credibility impeachment, leaving non-majority religious practitioners
vulnerable to baseless character attacks.489
An example of a court failing to protect a Neo-Pagan witness from religious credibility impeachment is the Kansas case of State v. Plaskett.490
The defendant in Plaskett was convicted by a jury for sexually abusing his
adopted daughter and stepdaughter. 491 Both victims were minors during the
time of the alleged crimes; the stepdaughter’s sexual abuse began at the age
of nine.492
Amongst the defendant’s challenges on appeal was the trial court’s refusal to admit a series of exhibits into evidence.493 The exhibits included a
letter that the stepdaughter wrote to a friend describing how she wanted “to
become a REAL witch,” although the defense was still able to crossexamine her about “whether she ever told anyone she wanted to become a
witch and wanted to use powers.”494 The reason the defendant sought to
introduce the letter was to show that the victim “had a vivid imagination
and that she did not restrict her thinking to verifiable facts.”495 Kansas, instead of following a rigid rule of evidence equivalent to Federal Rule 610,

485.
DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH
466 (2010).
486.
See id.
487.
Id.
488.
See supra Part III.B.
489.
E.g., Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 894.
490.
Id.
491.
Id. at 893-94.
492.
Id. at 894, 897.
493.
Id. at 913.
494.
Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 910 (testifying that she was “‘referring to a religion called
[W]icca . . . . [a]nd to be able to tell fortunes and stuff like that’”).
495.
Id.
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conducts a balancing test similar to Federal Rule 403496 to determine if the
evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice . . . .”497
Even though the trial court correctly barred the evidence about Wiccan
beliefs as irrelevant, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and found “the
prejudicial effect of not allowing evidence impeaching [the stepdaughter]”
to be part of “the cumulative effect of the trial errors [that] would require
that we reverse the conviction.”498 Based on the court’s finding of error
regarding the alleged abuse against the stepdaughter, the court also reversed
and remanded the convictions against the adopted daughter because the
claims were joined.499
In fairness to the Plaskett court, there were other evidentiary issues
and police testimony that were found to be “trial errors.”500 Yet, the court
still failed to recognize the victim’s Wiccan religious beliefs as sacrosanct
and outside the scope of permissible character impeachment.501 The defense
explicitly sought to introduce the victim’s Neo-Pagan beliefs to impeach
her credibility on the reasoning that somebody who believes in witchcraft
“has a vivid imagination,” and is therefore not trustworthy.502 How could
the court have sustained the challenge of not including the victim’s religious beliefs when such beliefs were completely irrelevant to the underlying
crime?503
What is most disturbing about the Kansas Supreme Court’s complicity
in tolerating a credibility attack on the basis of Neo-Pagan beliefs is the
precedential effect that all lower Kansas courts follow.504 Arguments can
now be supported by precedent that Neo-Pagan beliefs are not protected
from credibility impeachment, or minimally that the Kansas Rules of Evidence have some tolerance for Neo-Pagan character attacks.505 A closer
examination of Kansas court decisions reveals that such a discriminatory
pattern exists when Neo-Paganism is brought to trial.506
496.
Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445, with Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).
497.
State v. Leitner, 34 P.3d 42, 55 (Kan. 2001) (citing Curry v. Klein, 840 P.2d 443
(Kan. 1992), which explained an expanded role of KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-445 beyond the
“element of surprise” that the statute explicitly addresses).
498.
Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 913.
499.
Id. at 914.
500.
Id.
501.
See id.
502.
Id. at 910.
503.
See Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 914.
504.
Id.
505.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445; Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 914.
506.
See, e.g., State v. Leitner, 34 P.3d 42, 47-48 (Kan. 2001).
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Subsequent to the Plaskett decision,507 a spousal murder conviction
was upheld by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Leitner despite prosecutorial questioning of the defendant’s involvement with Wicca.508 A Kansas appellate court had already found the admission of the defendant’s religious beliefs to be in error, and the supreme court agreed that Wicca bore
“no relevance to the crimes charged against [defendant] . . . . The record
contain[ed] no hint or innuendo that [defendant’s] abstract beliefs had any
connection” to killing her husband.509
The court specifically recognized the highly prejudicial effect stemming from Wicca stating that “[i]t seems evident that our culture associates
witchcraft with Satanic worship and other evil practices.”510 Considering
the court’s supposed disdain for unnecessary inclusion of unorthodox religious beliefs into a criminal prosecution, the Kansas Supreme Court’s choice
to utilize the harmless error analysis instead of a more stringent standard511
gives additional form to the specter that attacks on the basis of Neo-Pagan
beliefs are tolerated, even if they are admonished.512
Having found error, the Kansas Supreme Court in Leitner had to
choose whether “to apply the harmless error rule513 . . . [or] the federal constitutional error rule to the erroneous admission of that [religious] evidence.”514 A harmless error review in application creates a very high standard to disturb a trial court’s outcome, because it disregards any error that is
not “inconsistent with substantial justice.”515 Cases that are reversed under
this standard require egregious evidentiary misapplication, such as failure to
allow a defendant to present exculpatory evidence516 or failure to allow
defendant to show compelling bias evidence against an adverse witness.517
A federal constitutional error review (FCER) provides a much lower
standard for reversal because the court “must be able to declare beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having
507.
Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 914.
508.
Leitner, 34 P.3d at 47-48 (defendant asserted self-defense after shooting estranged husband, stemming from years of alleged physical abuse).
509.
Id. at 55.
510.
Id. at 56.
511.
See id. at 55-56.
512.
Id.
513.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-261 (Supp. 2010).
514.
Leitner, 34 P.3d at 56.
515.
State v. Morris, 880 P.2d 1244, 1257 (Kan. 1994).
516.
See, e.g., State v. Getz, 830 P.2d 5 (Kan. 1992) (finding reversible error when
defendant could not present evidence that she reasonably believed property was entrusted to
her for sale by the true owner).
517.
See, e.g., State v. Mays, 866 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Kan. 1994) (finding reversible
error when defendant in sexual assault case could not present evidence that victim’s boyfriend previously threatened to “get even” with defendant).
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changed the result of the trial.”518 Examples of FCERs include the Fifth
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause,519 or here the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause.520 Whereas the harmless error review requires a
showing by the challenging party that substantial justice was missed in light
of the entire trial outcome,521 the FCER only requires that any reasonable
alternative outcome may have resulted if not for the erroneous evidentiary
ruling.522
Interestingly, the court in Leitner does not explicitly state which standard it applied, although much of the language suggests the court applied
the harmless error rule in finding that reversible error did not occur, stating
that “[i]t is clear in this case that the jury heard ample evidence to show
[the defendant] murdered her husband with premeditation.”523 “Clear” and
“ample evidence” suggest a lesser standard of review than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” as FCER requires.524
An argument could be made that the court did apply FCER to Leitner,
because it frequently referenced “overwhelming evidence” against the defendant, language consistent with other Kansas cases applying FCER.525
FCER, however, focuses on any reasonable impact the error may have had
on the result of the trial, not solely on the sufficiency of other evidence presented, which is what the Leitner decision did.526 Therefore, the court misapplied the federal constitutional error rule and reduced the defendant’s
constitutional interest by failing to address the specific impact that the “inflammatory evidence” about Wicca may have had on the jury.527
No argument is made that the defendant in Leitner would not have
been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without the prejudicial Wiccan evidence.528 The concern is that the court side-stepped the constitutional
protection of a defendant’s religious rights by minimizing the trial violation
518.
State v. McClanahan, 910 P.2d 193, 204 (Kan. 1996).
519.
E.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); see generally U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
520.
State v. Leitner, 34 P.3d 42 (Kan. 2001); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
521.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-261 (Supp. 2010).
522.
See generally Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (holding that a plausible alternative outcome would be sufficient to meet the FCER standard).
523.
Leitner, 34 P.3d at 57 (emphasis added).
524.
Id.
525.
State v. Pham, 10 P.3d 780, 788 (Kan. App. Ct. 2000) (reversing aggravated
assault conviction for “cumulative trial errors” including admissions of highly prejudicial
gang affiliation evidence).
526.
Leitner, 34 P.3d at 55-56.
527.
Id. at 56-57.
528.
Id. (finding self-defense not reasonable in light of defendant’s previous attempts
to murder husband, planned obtainment and concealment of the murder weapon, and multiple shots to the back of the victim’s head).
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under a plain error analysis, instead of the more rigorous FCER.529 Like in
Plaskett, the Kansas Supreme Court perpetuated the classification of NeoPagan rights as something less than constitutionally protected.530 Leitner
and Plaskett show how Kansas’ failure to have a rule equivalent to Federal
Rule 610 opens the door for the disparate treatment of Neo-Paganism in the
court room.531
North Carolina has similarly failed to provide a corollary rule of evidence to Federal Rule 610 and has also undermined the importance of NeoPagan religious recognition in evidentiary matters.532 The case of State v.
Theer533 is highly similar to Leitner534 in that a wife was found guilty of
first degree murder of the shooting death of her husband. The prosecution
in Theer introduced a litany of character evidence, including the defendant’s “alleged practice of Wicca” without any supporting inferences as to
how Wicca was relevant to the charged crime.535
While the court in Leitner set a dangerous precedent even though the
legitimate evidence against the defendant was seemingly more than sufficient to meet the burden of proof,536 the court in Theer failed to even dignify the religious rights of the defendant despite what was otherwise more
than sufficient evidence.537 The primary problem in Theer is that the court
accepted that Wicca had some relevance to the case.538 Acceptance of the
defendant’s religious beliefs to prove her guilty of murder is in direct violation of the First Amendment barring an exceptional circumstance where
religion is a central issue in the case.539 The court should have upheld the
verdict on the sufficiency of the proper evidence and used the opportunity
to admonish the prosecution for having sought to use religious beliefs as
character evidence against the defendant.540 Instead the court established a

529.
Id. at 56-57.
530.
Id. at 56-57; State v. Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890, 914 (Kan. 2001).
531.
Leitner, 34 P.3d at 56-57; Plaskett, 27 P.3d at 914.
532.
State v. Theer, 639 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
533.
Id.
534.
Leitner, 34 P.3d 42.
535.
Theer, 639 S.E.2d at 663 (including other character evidence the court accepted
to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake “under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b)” (equivalent to Fed. R. Evid.
404(b) standard): “her sexual promiscuity and affairs . . . her ‘alternative’ lifestyle . . . and
‘swinging’ . . . and her ability to manipulate men”).
536.
Leitner, 34 P.3d at 56-57.
537.
Theer, 639 S.E.2d at 663.
538.
Id. (“[W]e acknowledge that this evidence had a tenuous, at best, relevance to
the Defendant’s guilt.”).
539.
Id.
540.
Id.
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precedent that it is not a serious violation to attack a defendant or witness
on the basis of their Neo-Pagan beliefs.541
North Carolina’s reticence to accept Neo-Paganism as a protected religious belief is further evidenced by the custody determination made In re
Huff; a case that also implicates parental rights discussed in Part IV.542 In
Huff, the appellate court approved the guardian ad litem’s questioning of
the father about the parent’s belief in Wicca.543 The court acknowledged
that only “a limited inquiry into the religious practices of the parties is permissible, if such practices may adversely affect the physical or mental
health or safety of the child, and if the inquiry is limited to the impact such
practices have upon the child.”544 However, the court found “remarks by
three witnesses, and six pages of inquiry” during the father’s examination to
be brief and necessary to determine the best interests of the child.545
The most dubious line of questioning involved how the parents used
Wicca in ways an orthodox religious practitioner would pray to their deity:
for help finding a job and to help their child sleep well while in the hospital.546 The court referenced no similar inquiry of a mainstream orthodox
belief that involved three witnesses and several pages of questioning, thus
suggesting that Wicca was not given its proper recognition as a religion for
purposes of the custody determination.547 In other words, because no clear
precedent clearly stated the extended inquiry into the parent’s Neo-Pagan
beliefs was erroneous, the court was able to set the bar of error around the
lower court’s determination and almost indelibly allow similar inquiries in
the future about Neo-Paganism that would likely be viewed as unnecessary
and ridiculous to a mainstream religious practice.548
Looking at the evidentiary scenarios affecting Neo-Pagans detailed in
this section, the common denominator is the absence of statutory safeguards, such as Federal Rule 610, in some states’ court systems.549 Often
when courts are left to their own discretion, judges attach the societal

541.
Id.
542.
In re Huff, 536 S.E.2d 838, 842-845 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
543.
Id.
544.
Id. at 843 (quoting Petersen v. Rogers, 433 S.E.2d 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993),
rev’d on other grounds, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994)).
545.
Id. at 843-44.
546.
Id. at 842.
547.
Huff, 536 S.E.2d at 843-45 (citing Petersen v. Rogers, 433 S.E.2d 770 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994)) (contrasting only a case that
was overturned for excessive religious inquiry involving parents who followed a nonmainstream belief, The Way).
548.
See id. at 843-45.
549.
See, e.g., State v. Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890 (Kan. 2001); State v. Theer, 639 S.E.2d
655, 663 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
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prejudices of Neo-Paganism to an evidentiary ruling,550 if for no reason
other than ignorance.551 Once judicial discretion is applied, properly or improperly, the burden of proving judicial error is more often an insurmountable task, even when the judge improperly admitted prejudicial religious
evidence.552 While statutory safeguards are not an absolute solution because
a judge may still refuse to properly recognize Neo-Paganism as a religion,
the prevalence of improperly admitted religious evidence in courts that do
not have such safeguards strongly suggests that religious prejudice can be
minimized with them.553
VII.

THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE

The religious composition of America has been changing over the past
few decades in a faster and more diverse way than our nation has ever previously experienced.554 Different theories exist as to the exact cause(s) of
this phenomenon: whether it is a broader gyration of a recurring cycle;
whether it is culturally or generationally inspired; and/or whether the accessibility to global information has accelerated an inevitable shift.555 Regardless of the cause or causes, a fissure has developed between those at the
core of what has been a predominantly Christian (particularly Protestant)
society, and those who are breaking off and exploring new and/or different
ways of understanding their existence.556
Contemporary issues—such as the events surrounding 9/11 and the
unprecedented period of war our nation has subsequently faced—have been
wrapped into a series of indelible images that many perceive to be rooted in
the malfeasance of a religion that “propagate[s] terrorism.”557 Consequently, some within the traditional Christian majority have latched onto a
notion that our national heritage is Christian more strongly than ever.558
550.
See, e.g., Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890; Theer, 639 S.E.2d 655.
551.
See supra Part II.C.
552.
E.g., State v. Leitner, 34 P.3d 42, 56 (Kan. 2001).
553.
See, e.g., Plaskett, 27 P.3d 890; Theer, 639 S.E.2d 655.
554.
See American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008), supra note 131;
Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious Practice and Its
Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 128 (2003) (“[A]n exponential increase in
American [religious] pluralism, and in the number and diversity of religions . . . .
[C]onsumer culture is now applied . . . to religion itself as competitive religions have increasingly entered the marketplace.”).
555.
See French, supra note 554, at 128, 133-34.
556.
Id. at 141.
557.
Avigael N. Cymrot, Reading, Writing, and Radicalism: The Limits on Government Control Over Private Schooling in an Age of Terrorism, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 607, 608.
558.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 9-10 (explaining the engrained belief by
some Americans that the United States is a “Christian Nation,” a belief that has been periodically engrained legislatively); e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 4 (stating that a person may be
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Those at the core of these beliefs dig their heels in deeper and deem
that a common Christian doctrine is more essential than ever for our nation’s long-term identity and survival.559 Others, including many Christians
and various other religious believers and non-believers, oppose the projection of majoritarian religion into our government and military as an egregious violation of one of our most fundamental liberty guarantees.560 With
both sides advocating from conflicting stances that each views as more patriotic and constitutional than the other, every indication is that the fissure
will grow before the differences are mended:
[F]etishizing of the Constitution is unsettling. It's not that it
isn't worthy of veneration or study. It's that too often, the
Constitution is wielded as a political cudgel, even if . . . the
cudgelers fail to grasp the document's finer points. Both
parties are desperate to claim themselves as the true descendants of the framers, and they drape themselves in the
[C]onstitution like a political safety blanket, since it’s one
of the only unassailable quantities in contemporary politics.561
In just the past year, controversial topics implicating religion included:
the proposed building of an Islamic building near the World Trade Center
site;562 the military’s implementation of a spirituality test as part of the
“Comprehensive Soldier Fitness” program;563 the perception that President
Obama is a Muslim;564 and the constitutionality of religious symbols on

excluded from holding public office if he does not “acknowledge the existence of a Supreme
Being”).
559.
Id. at 173-204.
560.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at ix (explaining that most Christians have
not asserted a belief of dominance and that “[w]hen bad things happen to minority religious
groups and individuals . . . Christians have often been in the forefront of efforts to try to
ameliorate or remedy the situation”).
561.
Alex Altman, The Cult of the Constitution, TIME (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2011/01/06/the-cult-of-the-constitution/.
562.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Imam to Tour Nation Promoting Islamic Center
Proposed Near Ground Zero in NYC, FOX NEWS (Dec. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/12/24/imam-ny-islamic-center-tour-nation/.
563.
Countdown with Keith Olbermann (MSNBC television broadcast Jan. 6, 2011)
(describing a mandatory test that asks military personnel to respond to questions, such as “I
am a spiritual person” and then provides recommendations, such as “You lack a sense of
meaning and purpose in your life”).
564.
See Glenn Beck (Fox News television broadcast Aug. 24, 2010). The eponymous host tried to explain the confusion about Pres. Obama’s religion: “[W]here your father
is a Muslim, an atheist, your mother at least is not practicing any religion . . . . [I]s there any
wonder why so many Americans are confused by him? They don't recognize him as a Chris-
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government property.565 Even though much of the current friction may be
rooted in animosity towards Islam, any issue that implicates a non-majority
Protestant belief is vulnerable to scorn on the national stage.566
Neo-Paganism specifically received bad press in 2010 when U.S. Senate hopeful Christine O’Donnell first maligned and then made a mockery of
witchcraft in her failed campaign.567 In recent years, other notable public
figures have made disparaging remarks about the validity of Neo-Paganism
as a religion, such as then Governor George W. Bush’s comment that, “I
don’t think that witchcraft is a religion.”568
Ironically, the fate of religious freedoms for Neo-Pagan beliefs is held
overwhelmingly by Christian politicians and justices, and the rights of minority religions have historically been left to representatives of the majority
religion.569 The Supreme Court operated into the twentieth century with
only Christian justices, until the appointment of Justice Brandeis in 1916.570
Even subsequent to the appointment of “the Jewish seat,” all justices have
been of Judeo-Christian faith.571
Congress is also predominantly composed of Judeo-Christian believers.572 Despite the precipitous rise in beliefs other than Judeo-Christian, the
112th Congress is statistically overrepresented by Judeo-Christian adherents and underrepresented by all other beliefs:

tian . . . . [T]here are more people . . . who don't know what religion he is, than there are
people who believe he's a Christian.” Id.
565.
E.g., Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding an Establishment Clause violation for government to erect memorial crosses on roadsides for traffic
victims).
566.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 3-6.
567.
See AOL News, Christine O’Donnell, Not-a-Witch Senate Candidate: Where Is
She Now? (Dec. 17, 2010) (recounting the candidate’s prior statements that she “dabbled in
witchcraft” and how she ran a media campaign asserting “I’m not a witch”). O’Donnell’s
description of her dabbling did not resemble a cognizable Neo-Pagan practice. See supra
Part II.A-B.
568.
Interview with Governor George W. Bush, Good Morning America, ABC News
(June 1999) (criticizing the military’s recognition of Neo-Paganism).
569.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at ix.
570.
Religion & the Supreme Court, MOMENT MAGAZINE (Sep./Oct. 2008), available
at http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2008/10/SupremeCourt.html.
571.
Id.
572.
Jamelle Bouie, Where Are the Atheists in Congress?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 6,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/where-are-the-atheists-incongress/69010/.
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ARIS 1990
Survey573

ARIS 2008
Survey574

112th Congress
(2011) 575

Christian

86.2%

76.0%

88.8%

No Religious Belief

8.2%

15.0%

0.0%

Jewish

1.8%

1.2%

7.3%

All Other Beliefs

3.8%

7.8%

3.9%

There is nothing inherently problematic about these statistical disparities. The congressional underrepresentation of non-Judeo-Christian groups,
however, when combined with a religiously charged political environment,
is understandably cause for concern amongst religious minorities.576
The future of religious freedom can go one of two ways: either our
country shifts towards becoming a nation under a majoritarian JudeoChristian God, or it embraces the religious pluralism that is central to our
heritage and national success.577 Every case in which a minority practitioner’s religion is not recognized and given the full rights that all religious
beliefs are entitled to receive is a shift to the former.578
Perhaps a longer-term concern for those advocating for expanded recognition of Judeo-Christian beliefs in government is that our nation may not
be that far from becoming a people primarily without a majoritarian religious belief, or possibly a people primarily without any religious belief.579 If
the current majority became the future minority, would the same advocates
want majoritarian decision-making to use legal mechanisms to undermine
the rights of those with faith?
While Neo-Paganism has been the specific focus of this Comment, any
oppression to any religious belief or non-belief creates a dangerous precedent to the future rights of all, with possible repercussions rippling to those
in the present majority.
Our representatives and jurists in the present religious and political
majority are entrusted with guiding the future of religious freedom in our
country. May they recognize Neo-Pagan rights, along with the religious
rights of any valid belief, and continue to adhere to the understanding laid
573.
American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2001), supra note 124.
574.
American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008), supra note 131.
575.
Jamelle Bouie, Where Are the Atheists in Congress?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 6,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/where-are-the-atheists-incongress/69010/.
576.
Id.
577.
See BARNER-BARRY, supra note 19, at 6-7.
578.
E.g., Hicks v. Cook, 288 S.W.3d 244 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008).
579.
See French, supra note 554, at 195-99.
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out by Justice O’Connor, honoring religious pluralism and opposing thinking that would oppress religious minorities: “[T]he First Amendment was
enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are
not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of
our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian
rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups . . . .”580
BRADFORD S. STEWART!

580.
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing her opinion from that of J. Scalia’s lead opinion
that sanctioned the “unavoidable consequence[s]” that befell minority religions).
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